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ABSTRACT 
Automotive technology has continued to advance in many aspects. As an outcome of such 
advancements, autonomous vehicles are closer to commercialization and have brought to life a 
complex automotive technology ecosystem [1]. Like every other technology, these developments 
bring benefits but also introduce a variety of risks. One of these risks in the automotive space is 
cybersecurity threats. In the case of cars, these security challenges can produce devastating 
results and tremendous costs, including loss of life. Therefore, conducting a clear analysis, 
assessment and detection of threats solves some of the cybersecurity challenges in the 
automotive ecosystem. This dissertation does just that, by building a three-step framework to 
analyze, assess, and detect threats using machine learning algorithms.  
First, it does an analysis of the connected vehicle threats while leveraging the STRIDE 
framework[2].  
Second, it presents an innovative, Fuzzy based threat assessment model (FTAM). FTAM 
leverages threat characterizations from established threat assessment models while focusing on 
improving its assessment capabilities by using Fuzzy logic. Through this methodology, FTAM 
can improve the efficiency and accuracy of the threat assessment process by using Fuzzy logic to 
determine the “degree” of the threat over other existing methods. This differs from the current 
threat assessment models which use subjective assessment processes based on table look-ups or 
scoring. 
   
 
xii 
 
Thirdly, this dissertation proposes an intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect malicious 
threats while taking in consideration results from the previous assessment stage. This IDS uses 
the dataset provided from Wyoming Connected Vehicle Deployment program [3] and consists of 
a two-stage intrusion detection system based on supervised and unsupervised machine learning 
algorithms. The first stage uses unsupervised learning to detect whether there is an attack present 
and the second stage classifies these attacks in a supervised learning fashion. The second stage 
also addresses data bias and eliminates the number of false positives. The simulation of this 
approach results in an IDS able to detect and classify attacks at a 99.965% accuracy and lowers 
the false positives rate to 0%.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Urban populations are increasing at a quick pace [4]. This densification of the population is 
playing an important role in urban mobility and transportation overall. Considering these factors 
and customer demands, almost every major automotive manufacturer is researching advanced 
vehicle connectivity technologies and working on plans to launch driverless (autonomous) cars. 
Testing is currently underway, and experiments are growing rapidly. The prolonged future of 
autonomous cars is right around the corner and customers are waiting to exploit them. This new 
form of transportation will have a huge impact on our society. It will not only lead to a boom in 
innovations, but it will also bring the potential for new challenges which require innovative ways 
of thinking and solving [5].  
From the other side, vehicle cybersecurity research and experiments have shown that 
malicious attackers can penetrate a broad range of physical and remote attack surfaces in a car. 
Multiple research papers such as [6]–[10] give clear examples of vehicle breaches and have 
already made news headlines. With increased complexity and accessibility in intelligent 
automotive systems, the potential for additional attacks and vulnerabilities against safety and 
privacy increases even more. To cope with these challenges, this dissertation studies and 
proposes a three-step framework, which solves some of the cybersecurity issues in the V2X 
automotive area using machine learning algorithms. 
   
 
2 
 
1.1. Problem Definition 
The problem definition for this dissertation evolves from the following issues/gaps in the 
available research area.  
- Cybersecurity in automotive systems is a widely researched area, but specifically 
intrusion detection systems in V2X BSM datasets are not explored. Because connected 
automotive technology has not been widely deployed and commercialized, there are not 
many holistic studies for V2X cybersecurity as related to threat analysis, assessment, and 
detection [11] .  
- From the literature survey, multiple models for threat assessment and characterizations do 
exist such as EVITA, NHTSA, HEAVENS, OCTAVE, and others [11]–[13]. These threat 
assessment techniques are key to private organizations attempting to define the severity 
of a threat, but there is no defined framework which uses and considers this output in the 
specific implementation of other security systems (i.e., intrusion detection systems). This 
dissertation establishes a correlation between threat assessment and intrusion detection 
algorithms.  
- All of threat or risk assessments studied in this dissertation are done in a subjective 
manner, using tables, or scoring. During this process, the threat characterization 
assignment is not done using discrete variables. They are often assessed based on users 
prospective using linguistic variables and non-discrete definitions. Due to the Fuzzy 
nature of this process, this threat assessment process often leads to inefficient scoring and 
inaccurate assessments. This research is one of the firsts to attempt using a Fuzzy logic 
method to resolve threat assessment inefficiencies.  
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- When considering intrusion detection systems in the automotive V2X, they are often not 
seen as a feasible solution for implementation either due to a high number of false 
positives or due to high computational requirements. This dissertation attempts to 
propose a feasible IDS for implementation.  
- Lastly, there is simply not enough publicly available V2X or DSRC datasets for research, 
so the overall results are scarce. This dissertation uses one of the latest datasets released 
in this field.  
1.2. Purpose and Significance of the study  
Autonomous and connected vehicles have promised to lower the number of accidents 
caused by human behavior[14]. Some studies estimate that vehicles enabled by connected and 
self-driving technologies could reduce the number of accidents by up to 40% [15]. NHTSA 
estimates that V2X safety applications could eliminate or mitigate the severity of up to 80% of 
unimpaired vehicle crashes[16]. So, in overall the business case for connected and autonomous 
vehicles is clear; They will save lives and money if implemented correctly. Although there is a 
high potential for life-saving solutions, cybersecurity can be a bad syndrome preventing 
technology adoption. If these systems (autonomous or connected) are prone to cybersecurity 
attacks, then there is a chance that the number of accidents can increase significantly rather than 
decrease. Because the control is being passed from humans to technology, cybersecurity threats 
can do significantly more damage than they would in a driver-controlled scenario. The purpose 
of the research in this dissertation is to lay out those foundations as well. This study attempts to 
do quantitative and qualitative research in V2X cybersecurity while using artificial intelligence-
based technologies.  
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V2X security is also a relatively new area from a research perspective. V2X has not been 
widely deployed from automotive manufacturers yet, and that is the main reason why there is not 
enough available research on its security detection aspects. Currently, there are not many 
extensive and complete datasets available; therefore, there has not been a lot of experimentation 
with the intrusion detection systems in V2X systems. A simple search for “intrusion detection 
systems in v2x” in major research databases yields almost no relevant results. The dataset [17] 
used in this dissertation was gathered and compiled only a few months prior to being used. 
Therefore, this research study is significant from a qualitative perspective and one of the first 
research works using this particular V2X dataset from a quantitative perspective as well.  
1.3. Research Hypotheses 
The core question of this dissertation is: how can Artificial Intelligence-based technologies 
improve cybersecurity in automotive connected and intelligent systems? According to this 
question, there are three main hypotheses that this dissertation: 
- Use of the Fuzzy Logic methodology increases the efficiency and accuracy in threat 
assessment models.  
- Two-stage Intrusion Detection System using supervised and unsupervised learning is a 
feasible solution for V2X threat detection using basic safety message data.  
- There is a correlation between threat assessment and the algorithm or the configuration of 
an Intrusion Detection System.  
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1.4. Limitations 
Throughout this dissertation, there have been a set of general and specific limitations. Some 
of these limitations are listed below.   
- There are a limited number of datasets available to evaluate intrusion detection solutions 
in the V2X – DSRC space. Basic Safety Messages are used from the Wyoming 
Connected Vehicle Pilot project [17]. By using a newly released dataset with no 
published research available at the time of the study, there is a limitation to performing 
state-of-the-art benchmarking and comparison with other relevant works.  
- There is limited processing power available in today’s vehicles, making it challenging to 
fully explore advanced performance-based and machine learning algorithms in building 
intrusion detection systems. That is why Deep Learning-based techniques have been 
avoided in the second stage of the proposed intrusion detection system.  
- Threat analysis has been based on currently available research and not every threat has 
been tested in an actual vehicle or been taken into consideration for Threat vs. IDS 
relationship as shown in 6.1 [18]. 
- When assessing threats, there is no ground truth to measure the performance of the 
proposed FTAM solution. This is because different organizations assess threats in a 
different manner and this process is organization or technology specific. To cope with 
this, the FTAM performance is benchmarked and compared with other available models 
rather than validation with ground truth. It will be up to the end users to validate such a 
model.  
- Due to the nature and limited duration of the study, there is a limitation in establishing a 
defined relationship between the assess and detect phases. This dissertation does prove 
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the concept of the relationship, but further detailed and functional testing in real-world 
datasets need to happen before these correlations are concluded. 
1.5. Research Methodology and Procedures  
This study started with an extensive literature review of the following areas:  
- Automotive technology and connectivity;  
- Fuzzy Logic theory; 
- Cybersecurity and Intrusion Detection Systems;  
- Supervised and Unsupervised Learning algorithms. 
The results from the literature survey will be provided in Chapter II. This dissertation uses 
methods, results, literature survey, and builds upon my previously published work as referenced 
in [19]–[26]. Problem definition as provided in 1.1 identified gaps in the current state-of-the-art 
development. After a holistic view of the area, a three-step framework was then defined with the 
objective of covering some of these gaps and proving out the claims laid out from the research 
hypothesis given in 1.3. These steps are provided below and follow their respective 
methodologies.    
- Analyze: In this step, an analysis of automotive threats with a focus on V2X is done. This 
dissertation attempts to stay close to established standards, so the proposed solution has a 
higher chance of implementation and adoption. In this step, Microsoft STRIDE model is 
used for threat analysis [27]. Results are shown in Chapter III.  
- Assess: The assessment stage builds a Fuzzy-based Threat Assessment Model (FTAM). 
In this stage, five established models are used to benchmark and drive the design of the 
new proposal. FTAM attempts to close gaps and eliminate or mitigate drawbacks 
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identified from the literature survey for models. Although a new model is proposed, all 
the threat characterization levels are based on established models. From a Fuzzy logic 
perspective, a multistage methodology proposed from [28] is used. Building six Fuzzy 
inference systems is time-consuming, but all the Fuzzy rules are accounted for due to the 
possibility that they can all happen. The methodologies of Mamdani [29] and Sugeno 
[30] were considered for use in this stage. Sugeno is more computationally efficient and 
works better with linear and mathematical techniques. This solution required a more 
efficient method for human input, and that is one of the main reasons why FTAM uses 
the Mamdani method. As it will be described in 1, multiple established threat assessment 
models were used to benchmark and drive the design based on STRIDE threats.  
- Detect: The third detection stage aims to design an intrusion detection system. The 
methodology used in this stage is similar to a two-stage architecture approach used in 
previously published papers [20], [21], [31]. This method is validated to reduce the 
number of false positives, lower bias in data, and help with computational requirements 
in a variety of applications (vision and cybersecurity). The first stage aims to simply 
detect a threat, while the second stage attempts to classify it and increase the accuracy 
and lower the number of false positives. This stage uses the dataset from the United 
States Department of Transportation, Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program 
Office – Wyoming Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program [3], [17]. This dataset 
will be described in 5.1.2. 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:  
- Chapter I gives an overview of the paper, along with problem definition, purpose of the 
research, research methodologies used and its limitations. 
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- Chapter II gives the literature review on automotive cybersecurity, connectivity, and 
intrusion detection systems.  
- Chapter III performs an analysis of different threats in the automotive arena with a focus 
on V2X ones.  
- Chapter IV is focused on the assessment phase. After a review of current existing threat 
assessment models, it goes on to explain in detail the proposed Fuzzy based Threat 
Assessment Model (FTAM).  
- Chapter V focuses on intrusion detection systems. It first provides an overview of the 
dataset used in this dissertation and then proposes a new, two-stage intrusion detection 
system. This IDS leverages the results from the FTAM proposed in Chapter IV.  
- Chapter VI attempts to bring everything (Chapter III, IV and V) together in order to 
review and evaluate the complete framework. In addition, it provides details on results, 
performance evaluation, benchmarking, and conclusion. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Survey 
This chapter will expand on the literature survey for this dissertation. Section 2.1 will 
provide a historical perspective of the automotive industry, and 2.2 will give some insights on 
the vehicle architecture. Section 2.3 will start discussing automotive cybersecurity, 2.4 will dive 
deeper on the connected vehicle aspects, and the last section 2.5 will discuss different types of 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and their state-of-the-art results. 
2.1. Automotive Industry: A historical perspective  
The automotive industry has been around since 1770 when French engineer and mechanic 
Nicolas-Joseph Cugnot created the first self-propelled road vehicle [32]. Since then the 
technology has advanced, and an estimated number of 100,000 patents have been created from 
such evolution [33]. The revolution and wide commercialization came in 1913, when Henry Ford 
launched Ford Model T, an iconic car in the automotive industry. The continued evolution of 
automotive has brought to life many innovations and autonomous vehicles. From a technology 
perspective, autonomous cars have been in research long before today. The ability of cars to 
drive themselves has been an inspiring problem for many researchers and automotive companies. 
Currently, there are three main areas where the automotive field is heading towards[34]: 
- Connectivity 
- Autonomous mobility  
- Electrification 
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All three of these include certain cybersecurity aspects within.  
While Henry Ford once said that cars are “opening the highways to all mankind,” 
autonomous vehicles now are enabling mobility to all mankind [35]. They have the potential to 
revolutionize the way we move. Every breakthrough or advancement in technology comes with 
security and other risks [36] . Autonomous vehicles will have a huge impact on society but also 
face a few barriers before they go in full commercialization. The paper in [37] gives autonomous 
vehicle barriers and impacts as shown in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1: AV Impact and Barriers [37] 
Impacts Barriers 
Safety Security  
Congestion reduction AV Legislation 
Travel behaviors Litigation  
Freight transportation Privacy  
Vehicle ownership Vehicle costs 
Economic factors  Digital Mapping  
Urban development  Infrastructure  
Mobility  
Insurance Models   
As seen in Table 2.1, security and privacy are barriers in autonomous vehicle development, 
and they will result in an impact on safety and other factors. Research has been the lead of 
advanced technologies in vehicle development. To achieve and develop autonomous and other 
advanced automotive technologies, it requires extensive study and collaboration among many 
different areas. Major universities have put a significant amount of resources into autonomous 
and connected vehicle research, and they have been a crucial driver in this area. Some of the 
major research universities along with their centers are provided in Table 2.2. 
 
   
 
11 
 
Table 2.2: Autonomous Vehicle Research Universities  
Research University  Description  
Carnegie Mellon University Carnegie Mellon’s robotics laboratory has developed and published research in 
autonomous vehicles and automated driving for over 30 years [38] 
Tsinghua University  Tsinghua University has a massive research program focused on automated driving 
and electric vehicles. In 2016, they opened a Joint Research Center for Intelligent 
Mobility with Nissan [39]. 
Stanford University 
  
Stanford AI Lab was one of the pioneers to win the 2005 DARPA Grand Challenge 
in autonomous vehicles. Since then, they have been one of the leads in AV research 
[40].  
University of Michigan 
  
Mcity is a 32-acre, 10-million-dollar one-of-a-kind urban test facility for AV. The 
project scope looks at AC research but also evaluates how autonomous driving will 
shape urban planning [41]. 
Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology  
MIT explores the various dimensions of autonomous cars. Their Media Lab is 
researching the use of blockchain technology or morality for self-driving cars [42].  
University of California – 
Berkley  
DeepDrive program at Berkley focuses on researching computer vision and 
machine learning technologies for automotive applications [43]. 
Table 2.2 is not an exhaustive list of all universities or research groups conducting state-of-
the-art research in the automotive industry, but it provides some of the pioneers in the field. 
These university research centers have also served as the main sources from which this 
dissertation has derived its literature review.  
Autonomous vehicles are coming to the market gradually. As their evolution goes on, 
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) have developed the J3016 standard to define the level of 
automation for on-road vehicles [44]. Table 2.3 provides a description of this standard. 
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Table 2.3: SAE J3016 Autonomy Levels [44] 
Autonomy  
Level 
Name Vehicle Control 
0 No Automation Full driver control. Human drivers 
perform all driving actions. 
1 Driver 
Assistance 
Driver assistance technologies. The 
human driver is assisted by the system 
only in specific functions. 
2 Partial 
Automation 
The system can perform partial 
automation. The driver should always 
be ready to take over.  
3 Conditional 
Automation 
System drives and monitors 
environments. The driver should be 
ready to take over when requested by 
the system.  
4 High 
Automation 
The system handles the driving and 
monitoring environments. The driver is 
not required after the system takes 
over.  
5 Full 
Automation  
The system handles all aspects of 
driving.  
Although autonomous vehicles are being deployed and put into production by automakers, it 
has required a set of industry, governmental, non-profit, and academic institutions to bring 
together important pieces to enable such a system. A chronological series of these events and 
contributions from these players is shown below:  
- 1948 – Modern cruise control invented 
- 1968 – Electronic cruise control 
- 1980 – Carnegie Mellon University’s Navlab 
- 1995 – Laser-based adaptive cruise control 
- 2001 – Lane-departure warning system 
- 2003 – Pre-crash mitigation system 
- 2004 – DARPA Grand Challenge 
- 2010 – Google driverless car debuts 
- 2012 – Nevada licenses autonomous cars 
- 2014 – SAE J3016 created 
- 2014 – NHTSA issues a draft of proposed rulemaking for AV 
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- 2015 – University of Michigan’s MCity 
- 2019 – Multiple pilots on autonomous vehicles. Commercially available programs 
deployed (i.e., Aptiv-Lyft Partnership in Las Vegas or Waymo One) 
Table 2.4 provides plans from the major automotive manufacturers about their autonomous 
vehicle production. Please note that not all these plans are confirmed from their respective 
manufacturers and this information is current as of the time this paragraph was written (6/2018).  
Table 2.4: OEM Autonomous Vehicle Planned Launches 
OEM Autonomy 
Level 
Planned 
Launch 
Comments 
Audi 3 
4 
2018 
2021 
World’s first-to-market Level 3 AV 
[45] 
Tesla 4 2019 Tesla is currently selling “Self-
Driving Capability” [46] 
Ford 4 2021 Ride-sharing or ride-hailing 
production [47] 
Mercedes 4 2021 “Drive Pilot” – partnership with 
Bosch [48] 
BMW 4 
5 
2021 
2030 
Partnership with Intel and others [49] 
Volvo 4 2021 Partnership with NVIDIA [50] 
Honda 3 
4 
2020 
2025 
Vision to create a collision-free 
society [51] 
Hyundai  3 
4 
2020 
2030 
Targeting for the highway in 2020 and 
urban driving in 2030 [49] 
Toyota 4 2020 Self-Driving on the Highway [49] 
2.2. Advanced Vehicle Architecture  
To understand vehicle cybersecurity, one must start by looking at the recent vehicle 
architectures and their points of interaction. For the purposes of this dissertation, we define an 
“advanced vehicle” as a recently developed vehicle system with multiple complex automotive 
technology systems. These vehicles include a wide range of sensors, actuators, driver assist 
systems, and in cases also offer various levels of autonomous driving capabilities. The terms 
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“Advanced Vehicles” or “Autonomous Vehicles” are used interchangeably to depict such 
systems throughout this dissertation. The following three items are the major component 
categories that have major potential vulnerabilities in regards to cybersecurity [52]:  
- Sensors used to monitor the surrounding environments and make critical decisions on its 
driving patterns.  
- Communications provide a resource for the vehicle to interact and engage with other 
services to provide convenience and safety features for the driver.  
- Computing power and capabilities to manage and process the required information. 
Sections below will provide a summary of these components in each of the categories. 
Figure 2.1 provides a detailed architecture for an autonomous or advanced vehicle system. 
 
Figure 2.1: Advanced or Autonomous Vehicle Architecture 
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2.2.1. Vehicle Sensors  
The objective of vehicle sensors is to provide detailed monitoring of the surrounding 
environment and offer redundancy to maximize safety. Figure 2 provides an overview for a 
typical autonomous vehicle’s suite of sensors that work together to provide a 360-degree view of 
the environment around the vehicle. 
 
Figure 2.2: AV Sensors Diagram from [5]  
Table 2.5 is a detailed list of these sensors for each category along with the estimated 
number of them found in a Level 4 Autonomous Vehicle.  
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Table 2.5: Vehicle Sensors 
Sensor # Description 
Ultrasonic 12 Provides short range distance for 
parking and backup. 
Long Range 
Radars 
2 Long range radar uses radio waves to 
determine long-range distances 
between the obstacle and the sensor. 
Short Range 
Radars  
6 Short range radar uses radio waves to 
determine short range distances 
between the obstacle and the sensor. 
Cameras 10 Cameras collect images to monitor the 
environment. 
LIDAR 1 LIDARs are 360-degree sensors that 
use a light beam to determine distance. 
Infrared 
Sensors 
X Infrared sensors detect lane markings, 
pedestrians in low lighting by emitting 
or detecting infrared radiation. 
GPS 1 Global Positioning System 
 
2.2.2. Vehicle Communications 
For any vehicle to engage and interact with itself, with the driver or with other systems, it 
must have a communication system. Today’s advanced vehicle and tomorrow’s autonomous 
vehicles contain a variety of communication interfaces. These interfaces are usually categorized 
in physical and remote connections. Figure 2.3 provides a visual representation of such 
connections.  
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Figure 2.3: AV Communications 
Disconnected arrows represent remote access while continuous arrows represent physical 
access. 
2.2.3. Vehicle Computing  
The third main element in vehicles related to cybersecurity is the computing power and 
algorithmic capabilities. Since the early 1980s, vehicles have implemented microprocessors in 
their vehicle designs, mainly due to the complexity of features being offered. Based on different 
estimates, an autonomous or advanced vehicle will include an average of over 100 ECUs. Often 
the challenge is that these ECUs come from different suppliers with different capabilities and 
responsibilities. So, to unify this system and make it secure, there is a great amount of effort 
required from OEMs and suppliers.   
2.3. Automotive Cybersecurity 
With autonomous vehicles, the automotive world enters an area where security takes 
another level. Traditional computer security has already proven to be challenging on its own, and 
its consequences have often been disastrous[53]. Autonomous vehicle cybersecurity is another 
step which adds complexity into the system and brings the potential for even bigger disasters. 
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Cyberattacks in a computer system result in mostly financial losses, but autonomous vehicle 
cyberattacks have the potential to impact human lives even in a small-scale attack.  
Automotive security is often considered an emerging area, but vehicle security has been 
studied for quite some time. Traditionally, vehicles have been isolated systems, with critical 
components controlled by mechanical systems and separated from electronic or digital controls. 
This way, hackers have not been able to penetrate or control a vehicle due to the physical 
requirements for an attack. Other researchers and OEMs have reasonably argued that if a 
physical connection is required to perform cyberattacks then these attacks are simply not feasible 
or vulnerable enough [54][55]. One automotive cybersecurity solution is encryption-based. 
These solutions are proven to be inefficient for the CAN protocol [56], [57], due to 
computational and data overheads. To address the limitations of crypto-based solutions, 
researchers have proposed other methods such as Intrusion Detection Systems [56]. For instance, 
Hafeez et al. propose an intrusion detection at the physical layer. This is achieved by estimating 
the frequency response of each transmitter and training a neural network to use the frequency 
response as a signature to identify the electronic control unit/transmitter [58]. 
Lately, with the digitization of critical vehicle controls and drive-by-wire systems, the 
vehicle is turning into a “computer on wheels,” opening the doors to many vulnerabilities and 
cyberattacks. Many of these vehicle systems (such as CAN) were not designed with security in 
mind, but to simplify in-vehicle communications or OEM processes. With the introduction of the 
internet, computers started to connect with each other more and more. This essentially brought a 
revolution in the technology industry, and researchers found it difficult to put security measures 
in place because the technology or internet protocols were not built with security in mind. A 
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similar analogy is happening in the car industry [59]. Now that cars are starting to have inter and 
intra communication systems, it will be difficult to put cybersecurity measures in place.  
Vehicle security started to emerge in the last decade, once media put heavy attention to it. 
Table 2.6 shows a chronological series of events which have catalyzed the importance of vehicle 
security.  
Table 2.6: Automotive Cybersecurity Developments 
Year Event Security Compromise 
2002 Forbes published an article 
“How to Hack your Car” 
[60]  
Many news outlets followed  
Compromise engine, hybrid, and 
other performance factors  
2005 Car Whisperer tool from 
Trifinite exploited standard 
passkeys in Bluetooth 
connections [61] 
Bluetooth eavesdropping  
2007 The Telegraph published 
news about Hackers 
intercepting navigation 
systems [62] 
Navigation break-in  
2010 Koscher et al. published 
“Experimental Security 
Analysis of a Modern 
Automobile” [63] 
Disable brakes, stop engine using 
physical access 
2011 Koscher et al. published 
“Comprehensive 
Experimental Analyses of 
Automotive Attack 
Surfaces” [8] 
Exploits remote attacks 
2013  Valasek and Miller 
published “Adventures in 
Automotive Networks and 
Control Units” [10] 
Tutorial to Alter vehicle behavior 
via remote attacks. 
2014 Valasek and Miller publish 
“A survey of remote 
automotive attack surfaces” 
[9] 
The first resource for automotive 
network architecture review  
2016 Valasek and Miller 
published “CAN message 
injection” [64] 
Taking vehicle control via CAN 
message injection  
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2016 Keen Security Lab of 
Tencent published remote 
Tesla attacks [65]  
Tesla vehicle vulnerabilities  
2016 Liu et al. presented at 
DEFCON “Can you trust 
Autonomous Vehicles: 
Contactless attacks against 
sensors of self-driving 
vehicle” [6] 
Sensor attack on self-driving 
vehicles  
Back in 1985, only a few vehicle features were offered through electronic control, but 
nowadays and in the future, almost all the features are based on x-by wire or digital systems. 
While the vehicle technology and its complexity have increased exponentially, the vehicle 
cybersecurity capabilities have only developed linearly as shown in Figure 2.4 [66] [67]. This is 
often fueled by customer demand and the need for a fast-paced innovation in the automotive 
industry. 
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Figure 2.4: Automotive Complexity vs. Cybersecurity Capabilities 
Through computing, communication, and sensors, many intruders can lunch malicious 
attacks into a vehicle. At the same time, a lot of research has been conducted in the area to find 
cybersecurity solutions. Figure 2.5 provides a high-level overview of where these solutions are 
focused and what each of them means.  
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Figure 2.5: Design Solution Patterns [68] 
This study primarily focuses on Anomaly Detection type of solutions.  
2.4. Connected Vehicle: V2X  
Vehicle to everything (V2X) is a communication protocol designed to enable intra vehicle 
communication. It provides a way for the vehicle (V) to communicate with other (X) systems. It 
is currently based on two competing standards: DSRC and Cellular V2X. These are two-way 
wireless communications with short to medium range which allows for high data transmissions 
in vehicle to infrastructure type of communications [2]. These protocols have an emphasis on 
active safety application and are designed to have different capabilities for both critical 
communications for safety systems and service-based communications for added functionalities.  
According to FCC-03-324 [69], the FCC has reserved 75 MHz range in the 5.9 GHz band to 
be used for vehicle communication and mobility applications [70]. The purpose of these 
initiatives has been to ensure safe and secure connectivity between vehicles and other 
infrastructure components. These protocols promise to prevent a significant number of crashes 
and accidents in transportation, which account for around more than 35,000 deaths in the USA 
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alone [71]. Another main reason that V2X has been studied and implemented is to enhance 
mobility services within the transportation landscape. This will increase driver and passenger 
mobility along with new revenue streams and profitable business models from OEMs and other 
stakeholders. The subsection below provides more details on the DSRC protocol that is used for 
V2X.  
2.4.1. DSRC – Dedicated Short-Range Communication  
The basic idea behind the deployment of Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC) is 
to enable applications for collision prevention. These applications are dependent on frequent data 
and message exchange between vehicles and other vehicles or infrastructure. Therefore, the 
DSRC standard defines a set of rules on how vehicles can exchange messages in a certain time 
frame for time-critical applications.  
Figure 2.6 shows an example of a working DSRC-based collision avoidance system. 
 
Figure 2.6: DSRC-based Collision Avoidance System from [70]  
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Each vehicle equipped with DSRC creates a 360-degree situational awareness around itself. 
Through this “cloud,” it broadcasts information of its state in the form of Basic Safety Messages 
(BSM), which include speed, acceleration, location, control information, path tracking, etc. This 
information is usually sent out 10 times per second over a range of 100 meters. Every other 
vehicle within the range will also receive these messages from other vehicles equipped with 
DSRC. After receiving the message, the vehicle will estimate the trajectory motion of its 
neighbor, compare it with its own path, and compute if any of its surrounding vehicles poses any 
threat of collision [70]. In Figure 2.6, vehicles can prevent a collision in front of them, provide a 
warning when there is a vehicle at the “blind spot” or alert the driver of vehicles approaching the 
intersection. In addition to the V2V communication, vehicles can also communicate via roadside 
units using BSM messages. If a vehicle calculates that there is a potential collision approaching, 
the DSRC system will warn or assist the driver in controlling the vehicle.  
To explain this further, consider the following use-case scenario: The driver of a highway 
car does not stop after seeing a stopped car within a certain distance. This is a typical scenario in 
highway accidents. In this case, other cars that do not have a safe distance or the driver is 
distracted will result in rear-ending the vehicle and causing a chain accident. If these cars are 
equipped with DSRC, a warning can be issued to the car and breaks could be applied 
automatically avoiding the collision. To enable this use case, DSRC has a protocol and standard 
that specifically defines how the vehicles will communicate and interact with each other. This 
communication is based on a standard allowing interoperability among devices.  
 Figure 2.7 shows a block diagram of the protocol stack for DSRC communication. Starting 
with the physical layer, DSRC uses IEEE 802.11p, the 11p is mainly for the PHY and the MAC 
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layer. Going a layer higher, DSRC uses a set of standards defined by IEEE 1609. IEEE 1609 
includes 1609.1 for applications, 1609.2 for security services, 1609.3 for network services and 
1609.4 for channel switching. 
 
Figure 2.7: Architecture of DSRC Communication in the US from [70] 
As a collision preventing mechanism, 802.11p leverages the Carrier Sense Multiple Access 
with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/ CA), and for modulation technique, it uses Orthogonal- 
Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM). MAC sublayer establishes rules to access the 
common medium which can be shared fairly and effectively among various sets of stations. The 
Logical Link Layer (LLC) is based on the IEEE 802.2. Going further up, the protocol defines the 
type of network layer mechanism, that is either IPv4 or IPv6. This can be used to control the 
MAC layer [70].  
At the top, SAE J2735 specifies the message formats that supports many vehicles-based 
communication which includes the basic safety message (BSM), responsible for sending safety-
critical vehicle state information. In this dissertation, BSMs are used to build an intrusion 
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detection system and inject attacks. In its competing standard, for C-V2X, these message sets are 
defined from CAM (cooperative awareness message) and DENM (decentralized environmental 
notification message. While this dissertation is focused on BSM / DSRC, the proposed IDS and 
other methodologies can be applied to C-V2X as well.  
2.4.2. IEEE 1609.2 – Security for DSRC  
IEEE 1609.2 is the standard which defines the security of message formats and their 
processing used by Wireless Access Vehicular Environments (WAVE) devices. This part 
describes methods to secure messages and applications within DSRC. As it will be described 
later in Chapter III, there are multiple kinds of attacks that can hit WAVE, and due to the critical 
nature of this technology, it is crucially important to detail the operations and have a standard to 
carefully unify those services [69].  
Clauses 5 through 9 in [72] provide in detail the protocols, methods, specifications, and 
rules for all security services in WAVE. It is redundant to explain the whole standard in this 
dissertation but below some possible drawbacks are identified that might lead to attacks on this 
technology.  
The latest version of this standard was released in March of 2016, and it includes some 
updates for pseudonymous data and CRL (Certificate Revocation Lists) format. One of the things 
that IEEE 1609.2 defines is a signed protocol data unit (PDU). These signed PDU security 
managements contain a provider service ID with permissions headers, validity checks, security 
management fields, a reference to certificates, etc. And as the name states, they should also be 
signed. The signature is contained within the message, and the message is signed by a certificate. 
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The certificate is issued by a CA (certificate authority), which is chained to the root certificate 
itself [72]. This is similar to web-based security and introduces the risk of CA compromising.  
In addition, different from web-based security, vehicles are still behind on their 
connectivity, specifically if WAVE is retrofitted. Another drawback that raises here is how do 
you efficiently distribute CRLs in a vehicle environment when a CA is compromised? 
2.5. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a growing field in the area of computer science. It focuses on 
using certain algorithms to train or build machines to perform tasks which mimic human 
intelligence. The term was used first in 1956 at Dartmouth College where computer scientists 
from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Carnegie Mellon University, and IBM presented 
methods where computers would learn certain strategies [73].  
The field of AI started to become popular claiming success in problem-solving with 
symbolic methods, rule-based systems, expert systems, etc. Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) completed multiple projects, and years 1956 through 1974 were known as the 
golden years of AI. During this time, research was focused on reasoning, optimization, natural 
language, etc. After a long period of funding but with no major breakthroughs, multiple agencies 
started cutting their research funds, and criticism started looming. Limited computational power, 
limited processing, and storage capabilities made AI enter into its first “winter” (1974–
1980)[73].  
The technology evolved, big data became a trend, Moore’s law continued its progression, 
processing capabilities became abundant, and so Artificial Intelligence started to shine back up. 
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This is also known as the rebirth of AI. Lately, Artificial Intelligence is used in areas like 
customer experience, human resources, fraud detection, predictive analytics, robotics, vision, 
gaming, medical science, etc. AI is starting to become pervasive across different industries. 
Learning to reason and make a decision based on data is a powerful “prediction tool” and it can 
be used in almost any area where human reasoning or decision making is required. While it is 
impossible to go into detail for all its uses or branches in this dissertation, one of the most 
predominant branches of AI is Machine Learning (ML).  
Machine Learning (ML) is simply a set of algorithms which can train machines to do certain 
tasks without explicitly programming these tasks. This ability is what makes ML attractive in 
many areas, including cybersecurity. In this dissertation, supervised and unsupervised learning 
methods are used to build an Intrusion Detection System as shown in Chapter V. In addition, 
Fuzzy Logic as another branch of Artificial Intelligence is used to build the Fuzzy based Threat 
Model as it will be explained in Chapter IV. The sub-paragraphs below provide some review of 
all these three Artificial Intelligence branches.  
2.5.1. Supervised Learning 
In order to build a Machine Learning model, the algorithm has to “learn” in a set of data 
which is called training data. Supervised learning is a method used in Machine Learning where 
the training data contains labels. In the case of supervised learning, this data is labeled, which 
means that the data contains input variables (x) and output variables (y). The simplistic view of 
this method, is that the algorithm learns a mapping function from the input to the output y = f(x) 
[74]. These types of algorithms are used in stage two of the proposed Intrusion Detection System 
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to classify the type of attacks. Some of the best-performing and most well-known algorithms in 
this space are:  
- Neural networks  
- Decision Trees 
- Support Vector Machines 
- Random Forest  
- AdaBoost  
2.5.2. Unsupervised Learning 
Contrary to supervised learning, the algorithm “learns” on unlabeled data in unsupervised 
learning. This means that the training data contains only input variables with no output variables. 
The objective of these algorithms (also referred as clustering algorithms) is to learn by modeling 
and understanding the structure, behavior or distribution of the data [74]. These types of 
algorithms are used in stage one of the proposed Intrusion Detection System. Different 
algorithms are tested in this stage such as:  
- Canopy 
- Density Based K-Means 
- Filtered Cluster 
- K-Means 
- FarthestFirst 
2.5.3. Fuzzy Logic  
Fuzzy Logic by its definition refers to all the methodologies used to categorize classes with 
undefined boundaries. This theory of methodology was developed from Lofti A. Zadeh in 1964 
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at the University of California, Berkeley. The inspiration came due to a need to solve real-world, 
complex problems, which often did not have binary or discrete representations. In a similar 
fashion, threat models and their characterizations are indeed cloudy or fuzzy rather than discrete. 
This is also the reason why this dissertation attempt to use Fuzzy Logic in Threat Assessment. 
Since 1964, Fuzzy Logic has been used in a variety of applications, but according to the 
literature survey in this work, there is no substantial research that attempts to use Fuzzy Logic in 
threat assessment.  
Fuzzy Systems work on the premises of the following foundational elements:  
- Fuzzy Sets: Data sets with smooth boundaries. Majority of the elements described in the 
previous threat assessment models can be considered Fuzzy sets because they do not have 
strict or describe boundaries.  
- Fuzzy Rules: A rule used for knowledge representation describing the relationship 
between two linguistic variables.  
- Linguistic Variables: Variables or properties as describes by Fuzzy sets. 
As was mentioned earlier, Fuzzy Logic has had tremendous progress since its discovery. In 
[75], Yen and Langari do a thorough job at explaining Fuzzy Logic and providing its relationship 
with other areas. Let us look briefly at where Fuzzy Logic has been able to make an impact.  
- Approximate Reasoning: One of the first and most predominant papers in this area is the 
one from Mamdani [76]. In this dissertation, Mamdani introduces his method and uses it 
as a basis for modeling and decision making. If-Then rules and propositional calculus 
allowed Fuzzy to be used as a predominant algorithm in a variety of such applications. 
The usage of Fuzzy Logic in Threat Assessment falls into this category.  
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- Probability Theory: Probability theory and Fuzzy Logic are often seen as two competing 
methodologies. But Chain, Zhu, and Bazzi in [77] provide solid research about the 
relationship of those two. They use applications such as signal detection in the presence 
of noise or image segmentation to illustrate the value of hybrid Fuzzy-probability 
techniques.  
- Control Engineering: Fuzzy Control is essentially a control engineering technique based 
on the Fuzzy set theory. Many applications use Fuzzy Logic Controllers, which are a way 
to convert linguistic control methods into automatic control methods. Lee provides a 
good overview of such control techniques in [78].  
- Intelligent Controls: As a control algorithm, Fuzzy Logic is also being used in intelligent 
control systems by representing its knowledge in an organizational or hierarchal 
structure. Currently, there are many applications in this area such as vision-based 
systems, autonomous systems, and industrial controls. Silva gives a variety of examples 
specifically focused in this area of his book [79].  
- Analytics: Data science and analytics is an emerging field of today’s technology. The 
abundance of data creation along with advancements in computing and algorithms have 
made this field an important one for discovering and solving a variety of analytical 
problems. Classic machine learning algorithms are often used, but they are not effective 
for model interpretation. Fuzzy Rule-based systems have proven to be a successful 
method for model and knowledge interpretation in big data applications around 
cybersecurity, finance, medicine, etc. Fernandez and others provide a relationship of big 
data models and Fuzzy representation of knowledge in their publication [80]. In addition, 
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Herrera gives a good view of Fuzzy systems in data science and big data in his lecture 
[81]. 
- Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning: Pattern recognition algorithms are mainly 
categorized in supervised and unsupervised techniques. Fuzzy Logic has been mainly 
used in unsupervised learning methods to improve accuracy and handle uncertainty or 
outliers. For example, the Fuzzy C-Means algorithm (FCM) improves the traditional c-
means algorithm allowing a data point to partially belong in multiple clusters at the same 
time. A similar method also exists for the K-Nearest neighbor algorithm and is usually 
referred to as Fuzzy-KNN. Friedman and Kandel’s book [82] explains the usage of Fuzzy 
models in pattern recognition.  
- Cybersecurity: One of the chapters in [83] describes the usage of Fuzzy in computer 
security. An area where Fuzzy has been successful in Fuzzy logic is the intrusion 
detection system due to its ability to predefine and discover attack models. Fuzzy logic is 
mostly used in signature-based Intrusion Detection Systems. In addition, anti-virus 
companies have used Fuzzy methods to detect viruses. In this aspect, Fuzzy is used more 
for pattern matching as described in the paragraph above. This dissertation work uses 
Fuzzy Logic for threat assessment analysis rather than intrusion detection systems.  
2.6. Intrusion Detection Systems 
As seen in Figure 2.5, anomaly detection is one of the areas for vehicle cybersecurity 
solutions. These solutions are often called Intrusion Detection Systems. IDS are software 
applications that usually monitor network traffic for suspicious activity or any malicious attacks. 
They are evolving in their nature as well to keep up with the progress. They usually work by 
modeling the normal behavior of a system and then comparing it with the current monitored state 
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of the system. When an action significantly deviates from normal behavior, then the system 
analyses such behavior and categorizes the actions into a certain anomaly [31]. This is often 
called anomaly-based detection, and it works on the premise of real-time data. In most general 
scenarios, attacks start with probes and sweeps against the network hardware. Intrusion 
Detection Systems (or Intrusion Prevention Systems – IPS) look at the data to identify these 
sweeps and probes and give an alert against an expected attack behavior. Generally, IDS systems 
have the architecture shown in Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8: Intrusion Detection System Architecture 
IDS are separated into the following two main categories: signature-based systems and 
anomaly-based systems [84] [85]–[88]. Paragraphs below describe each of these categories.  
2.6.1. Signature-Based IDS 
Signature-based IDS monitor network traffic for probes and sweeps. Probes and sweeps are 
preconfigured, and predetermined attack patterns are known as signatures. These types of IDS 
are efficient for pre-known signatures but are inefficient when the IDS has no prior signature 
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knowledge [89] [90]. Therefore, the main drawback of signature-based systems is the 
requirement to continuously update the signature database. In addition, signature-based systems 
are also not efficient towards attacks with self-modifying behavior.  
2.6.2. Anomaly-based 
Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection Systems work on the principle of modeling the normal 
behavior of the system. They continuously monitor the data to create the baseline model, then 
look for deviations from that. The benefit of these systems from the signature ones would be the 
detection of malicious attacks even if those attacks were unknown to the system prior. These 
types of IDS have problems with high false alarm rates, the bias in the data, and high 
computational requirements [86], [91]–[94]. The IDS proposed in Chapter V falls under this 
category.  
2.6.3. IDS State-of-the-art  
When researching the automotive intrusion detection systems, there are several papers that 
have designed, built, and validated vehicle intrusion detection systems in a variety of approaches. 
As part of the literature, over 30 of these papers were considered to evaluate the state-of-the-art. 
On October 2018, the highly rated Journal of Ad Hoc Networks published a survey paper from 
researchers in the United Kingdom and Greece providing a great summary of these methods 
[95]. [95] has provided an overview of IDS in many environments ranging from aircraft, land 
vehicles, onboard systems, VANETs, etc. IDS is evaluated in this dissertation as state-of-the-art 
are the ones focused in VANETs. Table 2.7 gives a summary of these IDSs. All of the IDS given 
in this table are models with a TRL maturity level of 3. TRL 3 is described as “IDS have been 
evaluated the inaccurate simulation of vehicle states and attack mechanisms, possibly using data 
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from real vehicles” according to [95]. Below is a description of the elements provided in Table 
2.7. 
- IDS Reference: Reference of the IDS considered  
- Type: Whether the IDS is a signature based or anomaly based as explained previously.  
- Description: one sentence summary of the IDS. 
- Evaluation: Whether an analytical, simulation or experimental evaluation approach was 
used for the references IDS. 
- Technique: What technique does the IDS use. 
- Performance: performance results on the IDS 
Table 2.7: Vehicle Network IDS Based on [95] and Individual Papers 
IDS Type Description Evaluation Technique Performance 
[96] Anomaly Use SVM and NN to detect grey 
hole and rushing attacks. 
Simulation SVM, 
feedforward NN 
FP:1.21% 
FN: 0.23% 
[97] Anomaly Extension of [96] with sensor data 
and different algorithms. 
Simulation k-nearest 
neighbor, FFNN, 
SVM 
FN:0.12% 
FP: 0.22% 
[98] Anomaly Represent anomalous and normal 
behavior using entropy and detect 
outliers using K-means clustering. 
Simulation k-means 
clustering 
varies 
[99] Anomaly Detect threats based on data 
collected in a collaborative fashion 
(speed, flow, density, location). 
Simulation Statistical t-test FP: 2% 
[100] Signature 
and 
Anomaly 
Trust-based mechanism geared 
towards denial of service attacks.  
Simulation Rule-based 
system 
Accuracy 88% 
[101] Signature Detect DoS based on # of TCP 
SYN that has not been 
acknowledged within a certain 
time.  
Simulation Rule-based  FP: 4-25% 
[31] Anomaly Using Deep Learning to detect 
CAN message intrusions. 
Simulation Deep Learning Acc: 99.91%-
99.97% 
FP: 0.018-0.09% 
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Chapter 3. Threat Analysis 
The primary purpose of designing V2X connectivity is to improve road safety, decrease the 
number of accident fatalities and increase traffic efficiency. However, the desired functionality 
could be impacted by several threats, and attacks as this technology heavily rely on wireless 
communications. The main V2X threats are more likely to affect the following properties: 
availability, authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity. This section explores in detail the main 
threats and attacks that affect V2X systems. Threats below are primarily based out of the analysis 
done in [18], [102], [103], and [104], according to the STRIDE model. STRIDE is a threat 
modeling developed from Microsoft. Each of the STRIDE categories will be analyzed as follow: 
Spoofing in section 3.1, Tampering in 3.2, Repudiation in 3.3, Information Disclosure in 3.4, 
Denial of Service in 3.5, and Elevation of Privilege in 3.6 [27]. 
3.1. Spoofing  
Spoofing attacks attempt to spoof the authentication layer. Authentication layer is used to 
protect legitimate nodes from rogue insiders and outsiders. A good authentication mechanism 
generally prevents against several attacks, including black holes, spoofing GPS signals and 
replay attacks. The objective of this mechanism is that the resources and services should be 
accessed only by authenticated users.  
An example of spoofing type of attacks are masquerading attacks. In order to impact the 
decision of a surrounding vehicle, this attack uses a valid entity known as a mask. This may 
appear as a legitimate node, and it is hidden. It tries to fabricate false messages and sends them to 
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surrounding vehicles in order to impact the vehicle’s decisions. A malicious vehicle node can try 
to act as an emergency vehicle, and thus deceive other vehicles by broadcasting false basic safety 
messages into the V2X network, Other surrounding vehicles are deceived into believing that 
another vehicle is responsible for this attack [67]. 
 When malicious nodes fail or refuse to forward messages, then they create a black hole 
attack [16]. The black hole attack can be injected into any ad hoc network and is a common 
attack against the authentication mechanism. Black hole attack means that a legitimate vehicle 
never receives messages because of the malicious vehicle which pretends to be part of the 
network. The malicious vehicle is not a legitimate node in the network. As a result, legitimate 
vehicles become vulnerable to such attacks from vehicles. These attacks are usually performed 
by insider actors in the network.  
Another spoofing attack is GPS spoofing. In vehicular systems, GPS position information is 
an important variable for the vehicle and should be accurate. This information usually comes 
from Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). In spoofing attacks, a GPS satellite simulator 
is used to generate radio signals or messages that overwrite the signals from the accurate GPS 
satellite. This way, an attacker can spoof the vehicle to receive and process a different location 
than the one that they actually are. This can cause serious consequences for a car.  
3.2. Tampering 
Tampering attacks attempt to modify or inject malicious code or messages in the execution 
of the program. This has the potential to disrupt the operations of the vehicular network, OBUs, 
and RSUs because they receive periodic updates. As an example, we can look at [103], which 
describes a misconfiguration attack using country string field.  
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Another example of tampering attacks is when they fabricate and broadcast false basic 
safety messages (BSM). This is often done to deceive other cars and get other vehicles to behave 
in a certain manner. In addition to broadcast tempering, an attacker can also tamper transaction 
messages in flight. Tampering attacks are categorized as active attacks [105].  
3.3. Repudiation 
This attack happens when a vehicle refuses to accept the message causing the sender node to 
resend the message. Usually, this happens when the receiver does not verify the sender’s 
authenticity or freshness. Due to the broadcast nature of DSRC, these attacks are not feasible to 
happen in this environment, that is why they are out of scope for this dissertation.  
3.4. Information Disclosure  
Information Disclosure attacks attempt to violate the confidentiality of messages. These 
attacks are often used to track or record certain confidential information and have privacy 
consequences. A common example of these is an eavesdropping attack. These attacks only 
impact one vehicle and attempt to collect user or other information about that vehicle, such as 
payment information, identity information, etc.  
Another common example related to information disclosure is when attackers try to exploit 
vehicle tracking information. In general, an OBU sends out a BSM to inform other surrounding 
vehicles for traffic or safety situations. This message is signed with the OBU’s certificate and 
other identifiers. If the attacker is able to track this piece of information across time, then it is 
able to track vehicle location.  
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3.5. Denial of Service  
In a DoS scenario, the attacker attempts to bring down or overload the communication 
medium either by jamming signals at the physical layer thereby causing channel jamming or by 
flooding the nodes, so the vehicle nodes are prevented from accessing the network. The main 
purpose of the attacker in a denial of service attack is to prevent legitimate vehicles from 
accessing the V2X network and exchanging messages with other vehicles. A DoS intruder may 
attack either the individual vehicles (OBUs) or network units, i.e., RSUs[103]. 
An implementation of Denial of Service attack is flooding. These attacks flood the network 
with many false messages generated by malicious vehicle nodes. This causes the OBUs and 
RSUs to be flooded and unable to communicate with each other over the V2X channel. As a 
result of this attack, important basic safety messages are lost, and collision or other warnings are 
not delivered by the legitimate vehicle nodes. Spamming attacks are another type of DoS attack, 
and they occur when an intruder sends a series of messages to simply consume the network 
resources. The control of this attack is difficult in V2X as there is no centralized infrastructure. 
Lastly, jamming attacks disrupt the communication channel at the physical layer by 
injecting noisy signals in order to halt message transmission delivery. As a result, the 
communication channel goes down, and the vehicles are unable to communicate with each other 
or infrastructure services. Jamming is also used to hide the identity of the attacker. [18] 
3.6. Elevation of Privilege  
This attack happens when messages attempt to obtain higher privileges. For example, fake 
high priority messages which attempt to flash malicious software would consist of this type of 
attack. Because this dissertation looks at BSM messages, the elevation of privilege attacks has 
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similar properties to the tempering attacks. For this purpose, this type of attack is not injected or 
categorized separately from the tempering attacks on the dataset used in Chapter V.  
Table 3.1: STRIDE Threat Summary 
Threat Type Description  Property Targeted Discoverable 
in BSM 
Spoofing Fake identity  Authentication Yes 
Tempering Temper data Integrity Yes 
Repudiation Refuse to have done 
an action 
Non-repudiation No 
Information 
Disclosure 
Eavesdrop 
information 
Confidentiality Yes 
Denial of Service Overload the 
network with many 
messages 
Availability Yes 
Elevation of 
Privilege 
Unauthorized actions Authorization No 
Table 3.1 gives a summary of the STRIDE threats.  
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Chapter 4. Assess: Fuzzy-based Threat Assessment Model (FTAM) 1 
The second stage of this solution is to perform a threat assessment for automotive 
cybersecurity threats. There are many models for threat assessment and characterizations which 
are used in automotive and other applications such as EVITA[13], NHTSA[12], 
HEAVENS[106], OCTAVE [107] [108] and others as references in [12] [66] [109] [110] [111] 
[112] [113] [114]. Many such models provide a threat assessment and are key to organizations 
attempting to define the severity of a threat. All these available threats or risk assessments are 
done in a manual and linear fashion, using table look-ups, or scoring mechanisms. They are often 
assessed based on users’ perspectives using linguistic variables. Due to the ambiguous nature of 
the existing process, these threat assessment methods often lead to inefficient scoring and 
inaccurate assessments. The hypothesis in this dissertation is that the use of Fuzzy Logic 
improves the efficiency and accuracy of the threat assessment process.
This research is the first research, to our knowledge, that uses Fuzzy Logic to build a Fuzzy-
Based Threat Assessment Model (FTAM). EVITA, NHTSA, HEAVENS, and OCTAVE were 
used to benchmark and drive the design of the new model. The research methodology attempted 
to close gaps and eliminate or mitigate drawbacks identified from the literature survey for these 
models. Although a new model is proposed, all the threat characterization levels are based on 
established models or references frameworks. From a Fuzzy perspective, a multistage 
methodology proposed from [28] is used. Methodologies from Mamdani [29] and Sugeno [30] 
                                                             
1 This chapter was submitted for publication at the Journal of Applied Intelligence 
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were considered for use in the proposed method. V2X STRIDE threats as described in Chapter 
III were used in the design of FTAM [27].  
The organization of this Chapter is as follow: Section 4.1 will discuss the Threat 
Assessment Models used to design FTAM, section 4.2 will explain a Fuzzy multistage 
architecture. Section 4.3 will introduce FTAM and sections 4.4 through 4.7 will provide the 
details of FTAM. The last section in this chapter (4.8), will give details on the integration and 
implementation of FTAM. 
4.1. Threat Assessment Models in Automotive Cybersecurity  
Threat assessment is the process of identifying and characterizing a cybersecurity threat by 
evaluating and assessing its properties. This is a tool used by many organizations around the 
globe in order to evaluate their systems and perform a risk analysis against common threats. This 
process has been studied and researched from multiple angles. Currently, there are a variety of 
threat models, and they can evaluate and characterize various threats. SAE J3061 guidelines 
provide a set of principles for automotive cybersecurity which includes threat identification, 
assessment, and analysis [112]. This standard defines threat assessment as “an analysis technique 
that is applied in the concept phase to help identify potential threats to a feature and to assess the 
risk associated with the identified threats” [115]. J3061 also does not specify a certain threat 
model as a standard, but rather leaves this choice to the individual organizations and allows them 
to determine risk levels. Paragraphs below will analyze the major threat assessment models and 
provide some of their characteristics, advantages, and drawbacks. 
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4.1.1. EVITA  
EVITA is a European funded research project to design an automotive architecture for in-
vehicle networks. The objective of the EVITA project was to protect vehicle components and 
sensitive data from cybersecurity threats. The project started in July 2008 and concluded in 
December 2011. Among many of its deliverables, they also established a threat assessment 
model [13]. EVITA threat assessment combines attack severity, attack potential, and 
(un)controllability.  
To assess the attack potential, EVITA looks at the elapsed time, the expertise of the attacker, 
the knowledge that is available for the system, the window of opportunity available to perform 
the attack, and the specialty of the equipment used from the attacker. The severity of the attack is 
determined from the impact it has on safety, privacy, financial loss, and operational disruption. 
The third component measures how you can avoid (or control) the situation in an attack 
scenario[13]. EVITA is also known as a threat and operability analysis (THROP) because it 
focuses on the functional perspective for a feature when considering threats. This model is 
designed for the concept phase, and it requires a considerable amount of effort during the attack 
classification. EVITA also has issues with determining the accuracy for attack potentials due to 
using subjective operations. On the other hand, EVITA performs well in terms of threat 
assessment because it makes a clear categorization between different aspects of consequences in 
the severity step. EVITA characteristics are considered and used in FTAM. Table 4.1 provides 
elements of the EVITA model.  
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Table 4.1: EVITA Threat Elements 
Severity Probability  Controllability 
Safety (S0-S4) Elapsed Time  
Privacy (S0-S4) Window of Opportunity  
Financial Loss (S0-S4) Expertise of Attacker  
Operational Disruption  
(S0-S4) 
Knowledge of the System  
 Specialized Equipment  
Figure 4.1 provides an overview of how EVITA elements come together to determine a risk 
level. 
 
Figure 4.1: EVITA Architecture 
4.1.2. NHTSA 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has defined a composite threat 
assessment model for identifying and classifying potential threats in the automotive space [12]. 
This model is also referred as the “Threat Matrix” due to using a matrix nature when assessing 
cybersecurity threats. NHTSA model attempts to identify potential threats, provide information 
regarding existing attack surfaces and defenses, and categorize or assess the threats so 
organizations can develop attack mitigations.  
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NHTSA’s model shares common elements and is based on the following: STRIDE [27] , 
Trike [116] and ASF [117]. This composite threat model takes the following steps during its 
process:  
- Identify applications or systems which are critical for the vehicle’s operations. If these 
applications or systems are attacked, then they would have an impact on the safety of the 
vehicle. 
- After critical systems are identified, then the model would seek to decompose them and 
understand the interconnections between their composites. A diagram of the 
interconnections and a data flow diagram is created during this step.  
- Do threat identification. This is a continuous process that takes into consideration 
research and other cross-functional areas.  
- Threat Analysis is based on STRIDE and is a step which identified and categorizes a 
threat.  
Table 4.2 is used during this process.  
Table 4.2: NHTSA Threat Matrix [12] 
Matrix 
Category 
Category Description Options 
ID Number Identification number for 
the attack 
 
Attacked Safety and 
Non- Safety Zone 
Groups /Attack 
Support Zone 
Groups 
Groups of various like 
categories of components 
and systems that are 
targeted by the attack or 
that are used to support the 
attack 
Communications:  
o Internal communications paths (e.g., CAN, 
FlexRay, IDb-1394, MOST) 
• Vehicle Operations:  
o Powertrain - Engine control, hybrid drive 
systems, transmission, misc. power train sensors 
(e.g., torque converter lockup) 
o Chassis and Safety - Brake control, steering, 
environmental sensors, airbag sensors, tire 
pressure sensors, misc. chassis sensors (e.g., 
steering angle) 
o Body Electronics - Instruments, door modules 
(e.g., remote locks, light control, seat control) 
• Comfort Systems:  
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o Climate control, air vent positions, remote start 
• Infotainment:  
o Audio, display/video, navigation, embedded 
telephonic communications 
• External interfaces:  
o GPS, diagnostic ports, USB, Bluetooth, key fob 
Attacked Zone 
Safety Related 
Whether or not the 
attacked zone contains 
safety-related functions 
• Yes  
• No 
Component/System The component or system 
that is under attack 
E.g., the electronic braking system as opposed to 
an electronic brake actuator 
Vulnerability That 
Could Be Exploited 
Protocols/applications that 
could be used/corrupted in 
order to achieve the 
outcome of the attack 
E.g., lack of firewalls, easy diagnostic access 
Attack Vector Entry point of the potential 
attack 
E.g., OBD-II input, USB port, Bluetooth, GPS, 
audio system, etc. 
Attack Method The transport mechanism 
that could be used to 
launch the attack 
E.g., OBD-II input, USB port, Bluetooth, GPS, 
audio system, etc. 
Attack Type Type of attack that could 
be used 
• Spoofing identity 
• Tampering with data  
• Repudiation  
• Information disclosure  
• Denial of service  
• Elevation of privilege 
Attack 
Name/Scenario 
A compressed narrative of 
the potential attack derived 
from the use cases 
The narrative contains:  
• Name of the attack (title) • Who the attacker may 
be • What the targeted component/system may be 
• How the attacker may gain access to the 
component/system 
• How the attack may be launched 
Resources Required Resources that may be 
needed to carry out the 
attack 
E.g., hardware, software, access to vehicle 
(physical or remote), skill level 
Casualty Severity Projected outcome severity 
due to the potential attack 
• High: High likelihood of severe injury or loss of 
life; loss of control of vehicle 
• Medium: Potential to cause injury; experienced 
operator may be able to maintain control of vehicle 
• Low: No injury; no loss of vehicle control during 
the attack; attack motive was for theft, nuisance, or 
publicity only 
Financial Severity The outcome severity in 
terms of direct or indirect 
financial loss to the owner, 
OEM, 
• High: Could cause major financial loss to 
vehicle, business, or product reputation 
• Medium: Potential to cause moderate financial 
loss to vehicle, business, or product reputation 
• Low: Minimal loss to vehicle, business, or 
product reputation; attack motive was for nuisance 
or publicity only 
Trip Phase The vehicle’s movement 
category at the instance of 
the potential attack 
One or more of the following may be used: 
• Parked- not moving, engine shut off  
• Idling- not moving, engine running  
• Stop-and-go- i.e., heavy traffic  
• City driving- typical city limits speed  
• Urban driving- typical urban space speeds 
   
 
47 
 
• Highway driving- typical highway speeds  
• Any- Not speed-dependent 
Loss of Privacy Whether or not items such 
as 
onboard address books, 
vehicle location, or 
passwords may have been 
compromised and shared 
with un-trusted parties 
• Yes  
• No 
Outcome Ramifications of a 
successful potential attack, 
assuming no mitigations 
were bypassed 
 
Operator Override What an average operator 
may be able to do to 
override or avoid the 
ramifications of the 
potential attack 
• High: Extremely complex code; may attack 
multiple components/systems; may use zero-day 
exploits; may have multiple triggers; hard to detect 
and remove; may be persistent (launching attack 
payload more than once), and may erase itself after 
the attack is executed 
• Medium: Moderately complex code; may contain 
remote trigger; may be persistent; may use zero-
day exploits 
• Low: Non-persistent; easy to detect; makes use 
of potential vulnerabilities 
Difficulty of 
Implementation 
How difficult is it to 
implement the potential 
attack 
• High: Extremely complex to implement; may 
require prolonged and advanced physical access to 
the vehicle; may need specialized tools and/or 
knowledge to launch. 
• Medium: Moderately complex to implement; 
may require some physical access to vehicle; may 
need some and/or specialized knowledge to launch 
• Low: Easy to implement; requires minimal/no 
physical access to vehicle; requires no specialized 
knowledge to launch 
Likelihood The likelihood of a 
potential attack to be 
carried out 
• High: Well-known attack; very easy to perform; 
canned malware available for the attack 
• Medium: Some knowledge of system needed; 
access to entry point more difficult; some custom 
code needed 
• Low: Expert knowledge of component/system 
required; entry point difficult to 
access/unexpected; high level of custom coding 
involved 
 As can be observed, the table is large and confusing in some respects. This threat matrix is 
not recommended in SAE J3061 [112].  
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4.1.3. HEAVENS 
HEAVENS leverages Microsoft’s STRIDE model to perform threat assessment [106]. The 
objective of this project is to define security requirements similar to ISO26262 functional safety 
requirements. HEAVENS assesses threats according to several element. The three elements that 
HEAVENS will look at when doing risk assessment are: Threat Level (TL), Impact Level (IL) 
and Security Level (SL). As seen from Table 4.3, TL focuses on determining the likelihood of 
the threat and takes into consideration four elements. Impact level assesses the impact of the 
threat in the following four categories: Safety, Financial, Privacy, and Operational legislation. 
TL and IL are combined to derive the Security Level (SL), which is the output of the HEAVENS 
assessment. This model has an advantage over other assessment models because it benefits from 
the structured and systematic STRIDE approach, a property which is used in FTAM. From the 
other side, HEAVENS has a disadvantage because it requires an extensive amount of work to 
analyze and determine the safety level for each individual threat. This usually results in 
inconsistent assessment for different threats. 
Table 4.3: HEAVENS 
Security Level  Threat Level Impact Level 
Combination of TL and IL Expertise of the attacker (0-3) Safety 
Window of opportunity (0-3) Financial 
Equipment (0-3) Privacy 
Knowledge of the system (0-3) Operational 
 Legislation 
4.1.4. UM Risk Assessment Model  
Researchers at the University of Michigan have also produced a risk assessment framework 
for automated driving applications. This dissertation refers to this framework as The UM risk 
assessment model [114]. This model looks at impact, attack potential, and motivation to 
determine a threat assessment vector. Figure 4.2 shows the elements of this model. 
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Figure 4.2: UM Risk Assessment Model 
As it can be observed, The UM model is mainly based on EVITA but provides a vector for 
threat assessment rather than a level. This model is good at analyzing threats and improves on 
EVITA’s assessment due to its focus on automated driving. The analysis is well defined, and 
threat characterization is in line with other models. The UM model adds additional elements such 
as passion, ideology, etc., to further evaluate the motivation of risk. But from the other side, this 
model is not able to efficiently quantify the threat level using a discrete method. The output of 
such a model is a vector represented in three dimensions.  
4.1.5. OCTAVE 
Operationally Critical Threat, Assess and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) is another 
threat assessment model which focuses on organizational threats and practical issues. OCTAVE 
is different from the other threat assessment models because it focuses on the organizational risks 
and security practices followed by the organization and is not applicable to cyber-physical 
systems. OCTAVE has three phases. The first one is about the organizational view and takes in 
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considerations threats, assets, current practices, vulnerabilities, and security requirements. The 
second one looks at it from a technological view and considers the key technological components 
and vulnerabilities. The third phase looks at risks, protection strategies, and mitigation plans. 
This model is focused on the process rather than requirements or assessments. It is mostly used 
for information security risk assessments across the enterprise and is not applicable for cyber-
physical systems such as automotive systems. The reason why this is considered in this study is 
due to its layered approach, flexibility to analyze, and in-depth capabilities [102] [103]. 
Table 4.4 gives an overview of the previously described methods, along with their major 
characterizations, advantages, and disadvantages. 
Table 4.4: Threat Assessment Models 
Model Design 
Phase 
Applicability 
Major 
Characterizations 
Advantages Disadvantages 
EVITA Concept Severity, Potential, 
Controllability 
widely used, 
automotive-
focused, 
 
 
not conforming 
ISO26262, in-balance 
between safety & non-
safety threats, accuracy 
of measures 
NHTSA System List format FMEA focused,  Spreadsheet and text-
based, not favorable in 
the concept phase,  
HEAVENS System Threat Level, 
Impact Level, 
Security Level 
Uses STRIDE 
approach,  
Extensive effort for 
analysis, ambiguous  
UM* Concept Impact, Attack 
Potential, 
Motivation 
More 
comprehensive 
coverage 
Produces a three-
dimensional vector, not 
a level 
4.2. Multistage Fuzzy Architecture 
Fuzzy Logic helps with uncertainty and has many properties which help in threat 
assessment. In a threat assessment model such EVITA, for example, if a Fuzzy inference system 
is used, there are 11 threat characteristics, each of them with about 5 levels of assessment. If a 
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classic Fuzzy inference system is applied in this model, then there are about 115 = 161,051 
Fuzzy rules to be defined. Such a large number of rules is simply impossible and not efficient to 
design or maintain.  
Due to this problem, a Fuzzy multistage architecture proposed by Shaout and Trivedi in [28] 
is considered. In this paper, a performance appraisal system was designed using Fuzzy Logic. 
Using the traditional Fuzzy approach, their system would look like Figure 4.3: 
 
Figure 4.3: Traditional Fuzzy Approach in Performance Appraisal System [28] 
This system has five characteristics, and each of them has five linguistic variables. 
Therefore, this would result in 55 = 3,125 rules. To cope with this problem and reduce the 
number of rules, a multistage architecture was proposed. Figure 4.4 gives an overview of this 
architecture. 
 
Figure 4.4: Multistage Fuzzy Architecture Proposed in [28] 
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This architecture is able to group the relevant characteristics and create a multistage Fuzzy 
inference system. The referenced paper designs four different Fuzzy Inference Systems (FIS) and 
can reduce the number of Fuzzy rules from 3,125 to only 100 rules. The simulation of their 
methodology results proves to be valuable in reducing the number of rules and creating better 
relationships among Fuzzy elements. This method was used when designing the proposed threat 
assessment model.  
4.3. Fuzzy-Based Threat Assessment Model (FTAM) 
The Fuzzy-Based Threat Assessment Model is a new and innovative approach to threat 
assessment. Based on literature survey research, no other models use Fuzzy Logic for threat 
assessment. The objective of this dissertation is to produce a threat assessment model focused on 
vehicle communication systems and aimed to be a functional model. For that reason, the model 
proposed is based on other common threat assessment models. The following are some of the 
reasons why a new model is needed in the first place: 
- After a careful analysis of the literature survey, disadvantages and drawbacks are 
discovered for each of the existing threat models. The proposed threat model attempts to 
cope with some of those disadvantages, especially the ones related to vehicle 
communication. FTAM advantages are given after its analysis. 
- SAE J3061 as one of the defined guidelines for cybersecurity allows and encourages 
individual organizations to select their threat assessment of choice. This standard leaves 
room for new and additional threat models according to specific applications. 
- Threat modeling is a subjective process dependent on linguistic categorizations but often 
delivers a discrete level of risk. Dealing with subjective notations is difficult due to a lack 
of mathematical quantifications. Previously, it was explained that Fuzzy Logic performs 
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well in those situations. FTAM is the first model according to our research that leverages 
Fuzzy Logic in order to assess risks with subjective classifications. 
- SAE J3061 also leaves it up to the individual organizations to determine the acceptance 
of their risk levels. The proposed model is flexible enough to allow organizations to 
perform their threat assessment and determine risk acceptance levels. 
FTAM attempts to assess threats and characterizes them based on the following three 
categories. 
- Attack: Attack (A) captures the impact or the severity that an attack could do on Privacy 
(Ap), Safety (As), and Financials (Af), It is measured by the following:  
𝐴 = ∑ 𝑤 ∗ 𝐴𝑖
 
𝑖∈𝑝,𝑠,𝑓
 
(1) 
Where w is the weight for each component and 0≤w≤1.  
- Attacker: Attacker (T) assesses the capabilities of the attacker and its motivation. It 
centers this assessment on the following elements: expertise (Te ), resources (Tr ), and 
financial gain (Tg ) . The following equation measures the assessment:  
𝑇 = ∑ 𝑤 ∗ 𝑇𝑖
 
𝑖∈𝑒,𝑟,𝑔
 
(2) 
- Withstand Potential (P) measures the system potential to withstand an attack. It does so 
by looking at the system’s ability to control (Pc) an attack after it happens and the 
difficulty (Pd) to accomplish an attack. Its respective equation is:  
𝑃 = ∑ 𝑤 ∗ 𝑃𝑖
 
𝑖∈𝑐,𝑑
 
(3) 
The high-level architecture of such threat modeling is shown in Figure 4.5:  
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Figure 4.5: Fuzzy-based Threat Assessment Model (FTAM) 
Equation 4 gives a conceptual mathematical view of the proposed system. FTAM is not a 
real-time system and its Threat Level (TL) is determined by adding Attack Severity with 
Attacker and subtracting Withstand Potential:  
𝑇𝐿 = ∑ 𝑤 ∗ 𝐴𝑖
 
𝑖∈𝑝,𝑠,𝑓
 +  ∑ 𝑤 ∗ 𝑇𝑖
 
𝑖∈𝑒,𝑟,𝑔
− ∑ 𝑤 ∗ 𝑃𝑖
 
𝑖∈𝑐,𝑑
 
(4) 
Sections below provide a careful analysis of FTAM components.  
4.4. Attack Impact  
The objective of the attack impact is to measure the severity of the impact when an attack 
occurs. As described previously, this element is measured in terms of Privacy, Safety, and 
Financial loss. If this is compared with the EVITA Architecture, it is noticed that it lacks ITS 
interference. This is done intentionally because V2X threats usually do not have interference 
with ITS. This element does align with the UM model’s Severity element [114]. 
In terms of Fuzzy Logic, this branch is designed using two Fuzzy Inference Sets. The first 
one combines Privacy and Safety, while the second one adds Financial Loss. The block diagram 
for this branch is shown in Figure 4.6: 
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Figure 4.6: Attack Impact 
4.4.1. FIS1: Privacy and Safety  
The first Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) in this FTAM is the combination of Privacy and 
Safety. This is under the attack branch and attempts to measure the impact or the severity of a 
Threat. Figure 4.7: Fuzzy Inference System Model gives a generic view of how this FIS works.  
 
Figure 4.7: Fuzzy Inference System Model 
The fuzzification unit takes the input and converts it into Fuzzy quantities. The knowledge 
base holds the relationship rules between the inputs and outputs. The calculation unit calculates 
or “fires up” the operations based on each rule.  
FIS1 diagram for FTAM is shown in Figure 4.8: FTAM FIS1 and is comprised of Privacy 
and Safety. Levels for the Safety element come from ISO26262 and are defined as follow: None, 
Low, Medium, and High. Meanwhile, the Privacy element references the NHTSA model, which 
has assigned binary values: Yes, for an impact on privacy and No for no impact 
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Figure 4.8: FTAM FIS1 
The Safety Fuzzy linguistic input variable (FLIV) is characterized by a set of Fuzzy 
linguistic values. Their membership functions are represented by equation 5:  
𝑓(𝑥; 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) =
{
 
 
 
 
0, 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎
 
𝑥 − 𝑎
𝑏 − 𝑎 , 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏
𝑐 − 𝑥
𝑐 − 𝑏 , 𝑏 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑐
0, 𝑐 ≤ 𝑥
  
 
(5) 
Where a and c locate the basis of the triangle and b is the peak. Figure 4.9 describes Safety 
element transitions.  
 
Figure 4.9: FIS1 Safety 
Privacy FLIV is represented with two linguistic variables (Yes and No) and its membership 
functions are represented by equation 6:  
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𝑓(𝑥; 𝑎, 𝑏) =
{
 
 
 
 
0, 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎
 2 (
𝑥 − 𝑎
𝑏 − 𝑎)  
2, 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤
𝑎 + 𝑏
2
1 − 2 (
𝑥 − 𝑎
𝑏 − 𝑎)  
2,
𝑎 + 𝑏
2 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏
1, 𝑥 ≥ 𝑏
 
 
(6) 
Equation 6 creates a spline-based curve with parameters a and b showing the extremes of 
the slope.  
 
Figure 4.10: FIS1 Privacy 
The output for FIS is a transitionary output and named security. Its respective values are 
also from ISO26262: No, Low, Medium, High. For the first (no) function, in order to maintain a 
no-impact state, a trapezoidal shaped membership function is used. This function is represented 
by equation 7.  
𝑓(𝑥; 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑) =
{
 
 
 
 
0, 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎
 (
𝑥 − 𝑎
𝑏 − 𝑎)  
 , 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏
1, 𝑏 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑐
(
𝑑 − 𝑥
𝑑 − 𝑐) , 𝑐 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑑 
0, 𝑑 ≤ 𝑥
 
 
(7) 
For all the other membership functions in FIS1 output, a Gaussian-shaped function centered 
around the linguistic value and with σ = 0.5 is used. The reason Gaussian is used in this FIS and 
others throughout the paper is due not only to its ability to provide a smooth output and be non-
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zero at all points, but also to the fact that it can be formed from univariate sets. Its representative 
equation is as follows:  
𝑓(𝑥;  𝜎, 𝑐) = 𝑒
−(𝑥−𝑐) 2
2𝜎 2  
(8) 
 
Figure 4.11: FIS1 Security 
Rules for this FIS1 are shown in Figure 4.12. It is important to mention that the rules 
generated throughout this dissertation were through assessing and benchmarking STRIDE 
attacks with EVITA and HEAVENS models. In addition, FIS1 and other subsequent FISs 
account for all of the rules for each variable. It is possible that, if this model is commercialized or 
used for other applications, these rules can be changed based on further testing, validation or 
scope of implementation. Due to the nature of the individual assessments, all the rules are 
defined since it is possible that they can be triggered in different scenarios:  
 
Figure 4.12: FIS1 Rules 
All the rules have a weight of 1 and establish the 3-dimensional surface shown in Figure 
4.13:  
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Figure 4.13: FIS1 Output 
4.4.2. FIS3: Security and Financial Loss 
The next Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) is the combination of previous output from Privacy 
and Safety with Financial Loss. Since this is still under the attack element, the purpose is to 
continue evaluating how severe is an attack if it happens. FIS1 evaluated the impact on privacy 
and safety, while this FIS adds financial loss as one of the elements. Until this point, FTAM is 
aligned with EVITA and the UM model from a functional perspective [13] [114].  
FIS3 diagram is shown in Figure 4.14 . The Security input in this FIS is the same as the 
output of FIS1, while the Financial Loss is the additional input. The output of this FIS is attack 
severity.  
  
Figure 4.14: FTAM FIS3 
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Security input and its mathematical representation are already described in the previous 
section. While the financial loss is based on the German standard of the Federal Office for 
Information Security (BSI-Standard 100-4) [118]. There are essentially four levels for this input 
which are described as follows:  
- No Impact means that there is no financial implication when such an attack occurs. These 
Fuzzy linguistic values are represented by membership functions with a trapezoidal 
graph. Trapezoidal was selected due to its ability to preserve the zero state where: a=0; 
b=0.  
𝑓(𝑥; 𝑎, 𝑏) =
{
 
 
 
 
1, 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎
 2 (
𝑥 − 𝑎
𝑏 − 𝑎)  
2, 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤
𝑎 + 𝑏
2
1 − 2 (
𝑥 − 𝑏
𝑏 − 𝑎)  
2,
𝑎 + 𝑏
2 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏
0, 𝑥 ≥ 𝑏
 
 
(9) 
- Low value translates to a financial loss caused by the attack which is tolerable for the 
system. This and the rest of the membership functions under Financial loss are 
represented with a triangular equation for simplicity:  
𝑓(𝑥; 𝑎, 𝑏) = max (min (
𝑥 − 𝑎
𝑏 − 𝑎
,
𝑐 − 𝑥
𝑐 − 𝑏
) , 0) (10) 
For LOW parameters are as follow: a=0, b=1, c=2.  
- Medium means that a successful attack would result in substantial financial losses, but 
the system would still be able to stand. It is represented by a triangular graph with 
parameters: a = 1, b = 2, c = 3.  
- Lastly, the “High” level says that an attack would result in a high financial loss with 
severe damage to the system. Its membership functions are represented by equation 10 
with parameters: a = 2, b = 3, c =4.  
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Figure 4.15: FIS3 Financial Loss 
The output of FIS3 is Attack Severity, which is aimed at combined Financial Loss, Privacy 
and Safety impacts. EVITA, UM, NHTSA, HEAVENS, and others also include these or similar 
variables to measure attack impact (or severity). The output levels leverage a standard 0-4 scale, 
which is used in ISO26262, EVITA, and others. Its levels are as follows:  
- No – translated to no injuries from a safety perspective; no unauthorized access to data 
from a privacy perspective and no financial loss. 
- Low – means a relatively low impact of an attack occurs with light injuries from a safety 
perspective, with no Personally Identifiable Information (PII) being leaked and low 
financial losses.  
- Medium means that an attack would result in a severe impact with severe injuries from a 
safety perspective, with leaks of PII and a moderate financial loss.  
- High is the level where if an attack occurs would have significant damages, including 
life-threatening injuries from a safety perspective, privacy of data being impacted, and 
there being a significant financial loss for one or more vehicles.  
- Very High would be the highest impact that an attack can cause, e.g., fatal injuries, 
breached data, and a heavy financial loss from multiple vehicles.  
   
 
62 
 
- All those levels are described with a Gaussian membership function. Gaussian was 
chosen due to its ability to maintain a non-zero state at all points. Equation 11 is used for 
the membership function as follow:  
𝑓(𝑥;  𝜎, 𝑐) = 𝑒
−(𝑥−𝑐) 2
2∗0.3 2  
(11) 
The output of FIS3 is shown in Figure 4.16: FIS3 Attack Severity  
 
Figure 4.16: FIS3 Attack Severity 
The representation of knowledge between input/outputs in this FIS is shown by the rules in 
Figure 4.17: FIS3 Rules. It is important to mention that these rules are generated by assessing 
and comparing STRIDE attacks in the following assessment methodologies: CVSS, OWASP, 
EVITA, and HEAVENS [119].  
 
   
 
63 
 
Figure 4.17: FIS3 Rules 
These rules generate the surface shown in Figure 4.17. As stated previously, all rule 
combinations are accounted for, and they are generated based on assessment benchmarking. 
As it can be observed, when there is no impact on security, privacy, or financial loss, then 
the attack severity is 0. When these impacts increase, then the attack severity increases 
proportionally according to the knowledge rules:  
 
Figure 4.18: FIS3 Surface 
4.5. Attacker 
The next element to evaluate is the attacker capabilities. Similar to other Threat Assessment 
models, this is considered the attack potential. The reference models use a variety of 
characteristics to assess this element such as: Time required to perform the attack, expertise of 
the attacker, knowledge of the system, window of opportunity, equipment’s available to use and 
financial resources available. In FTAM, these are categorized into the following three elements:  
- Expertise – This is used in assessment from all of the Threat Models (Common Criteria 
[120], TVRA [121], OWASP , EVITA[13], SECTRA, and HEAVENS [106]). This 
parameter evaluates the level of knowledge that the attacker has in order to perform the 
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attack. Therefore, in FTAM expertise also includes the element “knowledge of the 
system” found in other systems.  
- Resources is another category which is found in different names across all the other threat 
models. It is the parameter which evaluates the resources available to an attacker in order 
to perform the attack. This is sometimes referred to as “equipment” as well, but in FTAM 
it also includes financial or other resources available to the attacker.  
- “Financial and other gains” helps FTAM to determine the motivation that an attacker has 
in order to perform the attack. Other threat models include this element in one shape or 
the other. Note that in FTAM, the word “other” is included which captures other gains 
that an attacker might have (i.e., ideology, etc.) 
The model used for Fuzzy is shown in Figure 4.19.  
 
Figure 4.19: FTAM Attacker 
4.5.1. FIS2: Expertise and Resources  
The first Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) in this branch of FTAM is the evaluation of 
expertise and resources available. As described previously, those elements provide a good 
assessment of the agent (attacker) level. The reasoning behind this FIS follows: If an attacker is 
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an expert, has the knowledge and the resources to perform an attack, then he is considered high 
risk. FIS2 model uses the “Mamdani” method and is shown in Figure 4.20: FIS2.  
 
Figure 4.20: FIS2 
The expertise element has four membership functions and is modeled primarily after the 
EVITA model:  
- Normal – this level means that the attacker does not have specialized expertise to perform 
the attack. They are able to follow simple instructors in order to mount a threat, but they 
are unable to succeed when these instructions are not clear enough. To represent this 
function, a pi-shaped equation is used. This function is generally used when the linguistic 
variables are more discrete in nature and can be clearly separated from each other. In this 
case, the attacker is clearly categorized into one of those areas, and that is why such a 
function is used. This curve is used for other levels as well and is described in equation 
12. For normal level, a = b = 0 and c = d = 1. 
𝑓(𝑥; 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑) =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0, 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎
2 (
𝑥 − 𝑏
𝑏 − 𝑎)
2
, 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤
𝑎 + 𝑏
2 
1 − 2 (
𝑥 − 𝑏
𝑏 − 𝑎)
2
,
𝑎 + 𝑏
2 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏
1, 𝑏 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑐
1 − 2 (
𝑥 − 𝑐
𝑑 − 𝑐)
2
, 𝑐 ≤ 𝑥 ≤
𝑐 + 𝑑
2
2 (
𝑥 − 𝑐
𝑑 − 𝑐)
2
,
𝑐 + 𝑑
2 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑑
0, 𝑥 ≥ 𝑑
 
 
 
 
(12) 
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For the normal MF we have a=b=0 and c=d=1.  
- Proficient – at this level, the attacker has some general knowledge about the security 
domain. This attacker is proficient in generally known attacks and is able to improvise 
many of them. This level also uses equation 12 and has a = b = 1 and c = d =2 
- Expert is someone who has expert knowledge in the security domain. They are usually 
familiar with all the pieces of the system, including algorithms, operations, hardware, and 
software. This MF uses the same equation as the other levels with a=b=2 and c=d=3. 
- Multiple-Experts is the last level of expertise. This level is similar to 3, but there is a 
team of experts which is attempting to mount an attack. Equation 12 is used to represent 
this MF with a=b=3 and c=d=4. Figure 4.21 shows the membership functions for the 
linguistic values of the Fuzzy variable Expertise. 
 
Figure 4.21: FIS2 Expertise 
The other element in evaluating the agent level is resources. This property attempts to assess 
the resources available to mount an attack. The levels of this element align with the majority of 
the other threat models (also commonly known as equipment) and are as follows:  
- Standard resources available means that devices required to perform an attack are widely 
available and the financial cost is relatively low. Example of this might be OBD cables, 
   
 
67 
 
laptops, or debuggers. The separation between these levels is somehow Fuzzy, so these 
are represented with equation 13 where a = −1 and c =1.  
𝑓(𝑥; 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) =
{
 
 
 
 
0, 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎
 
𝑥 − 𝑎
−𝑎 , 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏
𝑐 − 𝑥
𝑐 , 𝑏 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑐
0, 𝑐 ≤ 𝑥
  
 
(13) 
- Advanced – at this level, the resources are not widely available to the attacker. Although 
not readily available, these devices or resources can be purchased with a moderate 
financial cost and be able to mount an attack. Examples of such resources would be a 
group of PCs, access to cloud computing instances, etc. This level is represented with 
equation 14 where b = 1 and c=2.  
𝑓(𝑥; 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) =
{
 
 
 
 
0, 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎
 
𝑥
𝑏 , 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏
𝑐 − 𝑥
𝑐 − 𝑏 , 𝑏 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑐
0, 𝑐 ≤ 𝑥
  
 
(14) 
- Specialized resources are not available to the public or cannot be purchased directly at a 
reasonable cost. They often include resources which need to be manufactured or created 
separately and might include resources that are restricted. The financial cost to obtain 
such resources is also a burden for an individual attacker. This uses equation 5 with a = 1, 
b = 2 and c=3.  
- Highly Specialized – Resources required for this level are not available, needs to be 
designed and manufactured and often require multiple of them. This is the highest level 
of resources or financial cost required to mount an attack. This also uses equation 5 with 
a = 2, b = 3 and c = 4.  
   
 
68 
 
 
Figure 4.22: FIS2 Resources 
The knowledge in this FIS is also generated with the same methodology as the other FIS’ 
and is described in Figure 4.23 as follow:  
 
Figure 4.23: FIS2 Rules 
The output of the agent level is captured in the following levels. These layers are also used 
from EVITA and CC:  
- Basic: this level essentially describes an attack where the level of expertise is minimal, 
and resources are standard. A Gaussian function with a standard deviation of 0.5 is used 
in this case as shown in equation 15. 
𝑓(𝑥;  𝑐) = 𝑒−(𝑥−𝑐) 
2
 (15) 
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- Enhanced Basic: This is the level where resources or expertise became more advanced. 
This agent level is able to mount an attack with some level of expertise of access to 
certain resources. This graph also uses equation 15 with a different epicenter.  
- Moderate: This is the level where the agent has a good understanding of the system or has 
access to specialized equipment. It uses the same equation as the others  
- High: Specialized resources are needed in this level and expertise is also needed. The 
agent level is high, and the risk is also high 
- Very High: The highest level that an agent can be is very high. In this instance, resources 
are almost unlimited, and expertise is very high with the potential of multiple agents as 
well.  
 
Figure 4.24: FIS2 Agent Level 
Their representation and knowledge enable the output surface shown in Figure 4.25.  
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Figure 4.25: FIS2 Surface 
As we can observe, the agent level is dependent on the expertise levels and resources. 
4.5.2. FIS4: Agent Level and Financial or Other Gains 
In order to determine the Attacker’s motivation or its full potential to mount a threat, FTAM 
combines the agent level output from FIS2 with the financial or other gains. Figure 4.26 gives an 
overview of FIS2.  
 
Figure 4.26: FIS4 
The agent level input is already described from FIS2. While the Financial and other gain 
output is a new threat characteristic. Upon research, many of the referenced threat models 
evaluate this in terms of financial gains only, while others also add other characteristics such as 
hobby, ideologies, etc. In FTAM, this characteristic is all inclusive, and the users of such a 
model can assess its level according to their own requirements. Whatever the motivation of the 
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threat agent is, it is captured in four levels. This means that the end user is allowed to evaluate or 
assess this characteristic depending on the use case. This FIS uses the Mamdani method. The 
following membership functions make up Financial and other gain function.  
- None – this means that the agent does not have any incentive (whether financial, 
ideological or others) to perform an attack. In this level FTAM uses a step equation 
(equation 16) due to a clear separation between the values: 
 𝑓(𝑥; ) = {
1, 𝑥 ≤ 0
 
0, 𝑥 ≥ 0
  
(16) 
- Low – means that the attacker has some sort of gain into performing this attack. The gain 
in this category is usually for accessing a subsystem of the car. Mechanics modifying 
certain components might be included in this category. In this category, FTAM uses a 
Gaussian equation to describe the distribution. The standard deviation used is 0.25. 
Equation 17 is used in this case. 
𝑓(𝑥; 𝑐) = 𝑒−4(𝑥−𝑐) 
2
 (17) 
- Medium: In this category, the attacker has a considerable gain if the attack is successful. 
In these type of attacks, the attacker is usually attempting to gain access to the full 
vehicle in order to accomplish its objective. Equation 17 is also used in this case.  
- High: This is the highest level of gain that an attacker could have when mounting an 
attack. Usually, these types of attacks are due to state-sponsored agencies or terrorist 
organization where the attacker is highly motivated to perform the attack. This level also 
uses equation 17.  
The following rules are used to describe their relationship and generate the motivation of the 
attack. As mentioned previously these rules are generated by benchmarking STRIDE attacks 
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with the other referenced threat models. Figure 4.27 shows the membership functions for the 
linguistic values of the Fuzzy variable Financial and other gains. 
 
Figure 4.27: FIS4 Financial and Other Gains 
Rules shown in Figure 4.28 are used to describe their relationship and generate the 
motivation of the attack. As mentioned previously these rules are generated by benchmarking 
STRIDE attacks with the other referenced threat models.  
 
Figure 4.28: FIS4 Rules 
The output of FIS2 and FIS4 is captured as “motivation.” This is a combination of attackers’ 
expertise, resources, and gains; therefore, it describes how capable and motivated an attacker is 
to mount a threat. This is the only branch which uses non-unified membership function. To align 
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with the ISO26262, EVITA, HEAVENS, and UM models, four levels are used to describe this 
capability. The following are:  
- None – essentially means that if there are no resources, no expertise or no financial or 
other gains, the attacker is not capable and neither motivated to mount an attack. This 
level uses the same step function from equation 16 and essentially is able to propagate or 
maintain an attack with zero level motivation.  
- Low – means that an attacker has at least one of the factors (resources, expertise, or gain) 
to mount an attack. This level is described from a Gaussian equation with standard 
deviation = 0.4. 
- Moderate – means that the attacker has at least two of the factors to mount an attack.  
- High – this level describes an attacker where it has all of the elements to mount an attack. 
They have the knowledge to perform it, they have the resources to describe it, and they 
are also motivated to pursue it. Equation 18 is used but has a lower standard deviation of 
0.1 in order to emphasize the level.  
𝑓(𝑥;  𝜎, 𝑐) = 𝑒
−(𝑥−𝑐) 2
2𝜎 2  
(18) 
Figure 4.29 shows the membership functions for the linguistic values of the Fuzzy variable 
Motivation. 
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Figure 4.29: FIS4 Motivation 
Referring to knowledge created from the rules, membership function properties and 
following the Mamdani method then surface in Figure 4.30 is created.  
 
Figure 4.30: FIS4 Surface 
 
4.6. Withstand Potential  
The third arm of FTAM is withstand potential. As shown in equation 4, the final threat level 
is generated by the fuzzification of Attack Impact, Attacker Potential, and Withstand Potential. 
This last element attempts to measure the system capability for controlling or withstanding a 
certain attack. To do this, FTAM looks at Difficulty and Controllability. These are similar 
elements used across other models as well.  
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Figure 4.31: Withstand Potential 
4.6.1. FIS5: Controllability and Withstand Potential 
The fifth Fuzzy Inference System creates an intelligent system which measures Difficulty 
and Controllability. This FIS is the only one which is not proportionally directed. Therefore, 
some of the knowledge rules are negated from its usual form. Overview of FIS5 is given in 
Figure 4.32 .  
 
Figure 4.32: FIS5 
Controllability is a functional safety element which measures the system capability to 
control an attack. This element is also included in ISO26262 with four levels (C1-C3). ISO26262 
defines controllability as “the ability to avoid the damage through the timely reaction” [122]. In 
this proposed FIS, the same controllability levels as the ones used in ISO26262 are used 
- Controllable in General – This category is used when an attack results in the 
unavailability of a feature which does not cause vehicle safe operation. For this purpose, 
FTAM uses a Gaussian equation 18 with a standard deviation of 0.1. 
   
 
76 
 
- Simply controllable – This also follows the ISO standard. In parallelism, this means that 
99% of attacks can be controlled. Its membership functions are also designed using a 
Gaussian distribution equation 18 with a standard deviation of 0.475 in order to give the 
required transition. 
- Normally controllable – In this level, more than 90% of attacks are able to be controlled 
and contained by the driver. It is represented with the same equation and standard 
distribution as above.  
- Difficult to control – Lastly, difficult to control means that less than 90% of these types 
of attacks can be controlled or contained from the system. This corresponds with C3 level 
in ISO26262. The same equation 18 is also used at this level. 
Figure 4.33 shows the membership functions for the linguistic values of the Fuzzy variable, 
Controllability. 
 
Figure 4.33: FIS5 Controllability 
The other element to assess Withstand Potential is difficulty to mount an attack. This 
characteristic is also similar to the ones from other threat models and is represented using three 
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levels. Low, Medium, and High. Note the scale for this characteristic is from the NHTSA threat 
matrix. According to [12], these levels are defined as follows:  
- Low – means that an attack is not difficult to implement and requires no specialized 
knowledge to be mounted. For this purpose, a triangular shaped curve with elements: a = 
0, b = 1 and c = 2 is used. Its representative equation is 19.  
𝑓(𝑥; 𝑐, 𝑏) = max (min (
𝑥
𝑏
,
𝑐 − 𝑥
𝑐 − 𝑏
) , 0) (19) 
- Medium – means that an attack requires some level of knowledge to be mounted and is 
moderately complex to be implemented. In addition, these kinds of attacks often require 
physical access to the vehicle.  
𝑓(𝑥; 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) = max (min (
𝑥 − 𝑎
𝑏 − 𝑎
,
𝑐 − 𝑥
𝑐 − 𝑏
) , 0) (20) 
- High – the most difficult level, and it means that the attack requires a high amount of 
knowledge to be implemented and it is also complex in nature. These attacks require 
prolonged access to the physical vehicle. Equation 20 is used in this case as well.  
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Figure 4.34 shows the membership function used for difficulty.  
 
Figure 4.34: FIS5 Difficulty 
The output of FIS5 is the actual withstand potential. This output is measured in the 
following three levels 
- Low – means that the capability of the system to withstand an attack is low, and often 
attacks are successful. In all three of these membership functions, a Gaussian function is 
used. This has a low standard deviation = 0.2 in order to show the separation of the 
attacks. 
- Medium – means that the system can withstand the majority of the attacks due to either 
being complex or being able to control them. 
- High – means that the system can withstand most of the attacks. 
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Graph generated from these membership functions is given in Figure 4.35:  
 
Figure 4.35: FIS5 Withstand Potential 
FIS5 also has a knowledge base of rules generated in a similar manner like the other FIS. 
Figure 4.36 gives a list of these 12 rules.  
 
Figure 4.36: FIS5 Rules 
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After implementing the membership functions, and using the Mamdani method, the surface 
in Figure 4.37 is generated:  
 
Figure 4.37: FIS5 Surface 
As described previously, due to the negated nature or the inverse relationship of these 
elements, the graph surface shown in Figure 44 is different from the other FIS.  
4.7. Threat Level 
After evaluating or assessing the three different aspects of a Threat (Attack Potential, 
Attacker Capabilities and Withstand Potential), a final Fuzzy Inference System is used to 
determine the final Threat Level (TL) based on these inputs. The final diagram of FTAM is 
shown in Figure 4.38:  
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Figure 4.38: FTAM Architecture 
As observed, this is a multistage architecture made up from six Fuzzy Inference Systems. So 
far, FIS1-5 were explained in detail, their knowledge systems, rules, and methodologies. The 
output of FIS3, FIS4, and FIS5 serve as the inputs for FIS6 in order to establish a threat level.  
4.7.1. FIS 6: Severity, Motivation, and Likelihood 
FIS6 has three inputs and uses the Mamdani method. Looking at ISO26262, MISRA Safety 
Analysis [109] guidelines or other functional safety standards it is observed that a risk is assessed 
based on severity and probability. In order to stay close to these functional safety standards, 
FTAM uses a four level Threat Level (TL) assignment in this model – named E0 to E3.  
These levels are given in the following graph, and every Membership function is described 
using a Gaussian equation 11 with a calculated standard deviation of σ = 0.2778 
The diagram of FIS6 is shown in Figure 4.39:  
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Figure 4.39: FIS6 
As shown, FIS6 has three inputs and uses the Mamdani method. By looking at ISO26262, 
MISRA Safety Analysis guidelines or other functional safety standards, it is observed that risk is 
assessed based on severity and probability. In order to stay close to these functional safety 
standards, a four level Threat Level (TL) model is proposed – named E0 to E3. These levels are 
given in the following graph, and every Membership function is described using a Gaussian 
equation (11) with a calculated standard deviation of σ=0.2778.  
Those levels are defined and mapped with ISO26262:  
 
Figure 4.40: FIS6 Threat Level 
Benchmarking STRIDE threats against OWASP, EVITA, and HEAVENS, we have built the 
following knowledge – represented by these rules. Since there are 3 inputs, the number of rules is 
higher than other FIS as shown in Figure 4.41,Figure 4.42, and Figure 4.43.  
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Figure 4.41: FIS6 Rules 1-20 
 
Figure 4.42: FIS6 Rules 20-40 
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Figure 4.43: FIS6 Rules 40-60 
4.8. Final Integration  
After generating the knowledge base and FIS1-FIS6 individually, Simulink is used to 
integrate all of them together into a multistage architecture similar to [28]. Figure 4.44 provides a 
high-level diagram of the system. 
 
Figure 4.44: FTAM Simulink Model 
Blue elements characterize the Attack potential, green shows the Attacker capabilities, and 
red shows the withstand potential. The output of this model is a Threat Level. The individual 
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Fuzzy Inference Systems are build using MATLAB, specifically the Fuzzy Logic Designer 
application. After designing and testing the individual FISs, Simulink is used to integrate the 
blocks together. Special consideration is given so that the inputs and outputs for each FIS align 
accordingly. All the rules are accounted for since it is expected that they all can be triggered. The 
Simulink model is designed to show the output after each combination or layer. Constants and 
MUX blocks are used for input. The code given in Appendix A can instantiate the individual FIS 
elements in the Simulink model so it can be used or integrated into other applications.
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Chapter 5. Detect: Two Stage Intrusion Detection Intelligent System based on FTAM
2
 
During this three-step framework targeted mainly at automotive cybersecurity, the “Detect” 
phase is defined as a mean to detect malicious threats. In this dissertation, an intrusion detection 
system (IDS) is proposed to detect malicious attacks in a regular network while taking into 
consideration the results from the previous assessment stage. In addition, performance evaluation 
along with computational requirements are analyzed. The proposed IDS consists of a two-stage 
Intrusion Detection System based on machine learning algorithms. The first stage labels (detects) 
whether there is an attack present, and the second stage classifies these attacks in a supervised 
learning methodology. The second stage also addresses and eliminates the number of false 
positives. The simulation of this approach results is an IDS able to detect and classify a 99.965% 
accuracy and lower the false positives rate to 0%. In addition, the algorithmic results are 
correlated with threat assessment levels to build a relationship. To build such a system, the 
dataset from Wyoming Connected Vehicle Deployment program is used [3].  
The organization of this Chapter is as follow: Section 5.1 will give an overview of the 
dataset used, 5.2 will discuss the adversary models for the threats, 5.3 will describe some of the 
data pre-processing methodologies, and 5.4 will describe in detail the proposed two-stage IDS. 
                                                             
2 A version of this chapter was previously published as an article in a peer-reviewed journal:  
N. Kaja, A. Shaout, and D. Ma, “An Intelligent Intrusion Detection System,” J. Appl. Intell., pp. 
1–13, 2019 
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5.1. Data Set: Wyoming Connected Vehicle Pilot 
5.1.1. Data Collection  
As mentioned previously, V2X is a relatively new technology, and currently there are not a 
lot of vehicle manufacturers that have deployed the technology in production as of 2018. Based 
on a quick internet search of recent news, only General Motors and Audi have currently 
deployed this technology on the road. Even these efforts are limited in scope. This makes it 
difficult to access readily available datasets for research and find well-studied performance 
results in V2X security or intrusion detection models.  
From a research perspective, both academia and industry have done an extensive amount of 
research regarding V2X performance and other aspects. The majority of these research studies 
have often been theoretical, analytical, or functional in nature. In 2015, the US Department of 
Transportation launched a Connected Vehicle pilot program sponsored by the Intelligent 
Transportation Systems Joint Program office. Through this program, three state agencies (New 
York City DOT Pilot, Tampa-Hillsborough Expressway Authority Pilot and Wyoming DOT 
Pilot) started pilot programs. All three pilots had different objectives, ranging from functionality, 
interoperability, security using industry standards. Publications and deliverables of these pilots 
are found on the DOT website: https://www.its.dot.gov/pilots/technical_assistance_events.htm 
(as of 03/28/2019).  
This dissertation leverages the data produced from the Wyoming DOT Pilot since that is one 
of the first pilots that made its data publicly available[17]. Data consists of actual Basic Safety 
Messages (BSM) and was gathered during February–March of 2018 and published in the same 
year at www.data.gov. To put the timeline and the freshness of data in perspective: Wyoming 
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CV Pilot Conceptual Development Phase goes from 09/2015–08/2016, Design/Build/Test Phase 
goes from September 2016 – Spring 2019 and Operate/Maintenance Phase goes from Fall 2018–
Fall 2020. Research for this dissertation was done in 2018 and early 2019.  
Wyoming DOT Pilot data was gathered from a difficult highway segment (I80) with a 
significant number of accidents, mainly due to weather conditions. According to DOT, in four 
years, Interstate 80 in Wyoming (where data was gathered) produced over 200 trucks rollovers 
from high winds, 86 road closures and roughly $12Million loss due to each closure. Figure 5.1 
gives a better view of the map where data was gathered:  
 
Figure 5.1: Wyoming I80 Corridor - Connected Vehicle Map [3] 
Based on the current literature survey, this study is one of the first to study and publish 
results out of this dataset.  
5.1.2. Data Description  
The dataset used for proposing the IDS contains core and non-core BSM elements. The 
standard for BSM is described in SAE-J2735 standard [123]. Basic Safety Messages are used to 
exchange vehicle safety status data according to the DSRC standard. Messages are broadcasted 
10 times per second. The file used for this experiment was downloaded from the official Federal 
Government repository (www.data.gov) and contains over 4 Million basic safety messages. To 
facilitate handling, this large file was split into 4 smaller files and attacks were injected 
according to the adversary models defined in 3.1-3.6. Data used for training was gathered in the 
segment shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Google Map Generated from Training Data BSM Points 
Start and end points are generated from the start BSM Latitude/Longitude and end BSM 
Latitude/Longitude. Table 5.1 shows the core elements contained in Part 1 of BSM and used as 
features for the proposed Intrusion Detection System:  
Table 5.1: BSM Data Dictionary According to [123] 
Data Element Description 
coreData_msgCnt 
MsgCount data element is used to provide a 
sequence number within a stream of messages 
with the same DSRCmsgID and from the same 
sender 
coreData_id 
This is the 4-octet random device identifier, 
called the TemporaryID. When used for a 
mobile OBU device, this value will change 
periodically to ensure the overall anonymity of 
the vehicle, unlike typical wireless or wired 
802 device ID. 
coreData_secMark 
The DSRC second expressed in this data 
element consists of integer values from zero to 
60999, representing the milliseconds within a 
minute. 
coreData_position_lat 
The geographic latitude of an object, 
expressed in 1/10th integer microdegrees, as a 
31-bit value, and with reference to the 
horizontal datum then in use 
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coreData_position_long 
The geographic longitude of an object, 
expressed in 1/10th integer microdegrees, as a 
32-bit value, and with reference to the 
horizontal datum then in use. 
coreData_elevation 
The DE_Elevation data element represents the 
geographic position above or below the 
reference ellipsoid (typically WGS-84). 
coreData_accelset_accelYaw 
This data frame is a set of acceleration values 
in 3 orthogonal directions of the vehicle and 
with yaw rotation rates, expressed as a 
structure. 
coreData_accuracy_semiMajor 
The DE_SemiMajorAxisAccuracy data 
element is used to express the radius (length) 
of the semi-major axis of an ellipsoid 
representing the accuracy which can be 
expected from a GNSS system in 5cm steps, 
typically at a one sigma level of confidence. 
coreData_accuracy_semiMinor 
The DE_SemiMinorAxisAccuracy data 
element is used to express the radius of the 
semi-minor axis of an ellipsoid representing 
the accuracy which can be expected from a 
GNSS system in 5cm steps, typically at a one 
sigma level of confidence 
coreData_transmission 
The DE_TransmissionState data element is 
used to provide the current state of the vehicle 
transmission 
coreData_speed 
This data element represents the vehicle speed 
expressed in unsigned units of 0.02 meters per 
second. 
coreData_heading 
The DE_Heading data element provides the 
current heading of the sending device, 
expressed in unsigned units of 0.0125 degrees 
from North such that 28799 such degrees 
represent 359.9875 degrees 
coreData_brakes_wheelBrakes_leftFront The Brake System Status data frame conveys a 
variety of information about the current brake 
and system control activity of the vehicle. The 
structure consists of a sequence of items which 
provide status flags for any active brakes per 
wheel, the traction control system, the anti-
lock brake system, the stability control system, 
the brake boost system, and the auxiliary brake 
system. 
coreData_brakes_wheelBrakes_rightFront 
coreData_brakes_wheelBrakes_unavailable 
coreData_brakes_wheelBrakes_leftRear 
coreData_brakes_wheelBrakes_rightRear 
coreData_brakes_traction 
coreData_brakes_abs 
coreData_brakes_scs 
coreData_brakes_brakeBoost 
coreData_brakes_auxBrakes 
coreData_size 
The DF_VehicleSize is a data frame 
representing the vehicle length and vehicle 
width in a single data concept. 
coreData_SteeringWheelAngle 
The angle of the driver’s steering wheel, 
expressed in a signed (to the right being 
positive) value with LSB units of 1.5 degrees. 
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5.2. Adversary Model 
Attacks injected in the dataset are defined according to the STRIDE model. Not all of the 
STRIDE attacks are injected, but rather the focus is on the ones that were assessed at different 
levels according to FTAM and are BSM level attacks. Injected attacks are described below and 
give an overview of the adversary model used.  
- Spoofing (S) – this attack is assessed as E2 from FTAM – The attack is injected by 
masquerading certain BSM data, so it looks like the messages are coming from a certain 
vehicle. The dataset contains 95 spoofing packages, from a specific OBU ID with 
spoofed vehicle safety elements. The spoofed vehicle attempts to lower the speed 
immediately.  
- Tempering (T) – this attack is assessed as E3 from FTAM – The dataset contains 1,967 
BSM messages with tempered speed and gear values. In a real scenario, this would look 
like a reckless driving car.  
- Information Disclosure (I) – this attack is assessed as E1 from FTAM – This attack is 
realized by eavesdropping or trying to listen in the communication channel in order to 
intercept communication. 1,648 BSM messages are injected with a specific coreData_id, 
which correspondents with a device identifier.  
- Denial of Service (D) – this attack is assessed as E3 from FTAM – This attack attempts 
to disrupt the V2X network by jamming the communication and resending a massive 
number of packages. In our scenario, we have resent the same package 220 times in a 
short period of time.  
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5.3. Feature Engineering 
After performing preliminary tests on the dataset, it is discovered there are a significant 
number of redundancies and similarities in the dataset. From these initial tests, it is observed that 
training leads to a bias towards the more frequent records. The data itself is also too large to 
process, and often initial results lead to overfitting. This causes the model to perform well on the 
training set, but not as well on the test data. To pre-process the data, correlated features are 
identified and removed to avoid overfitting. These features are closely correlated with each other 
and are unable to allow the system to infer much knowledge from them [26] . 
Since the data comes with 24 features, then dimensionality reduction is needed. First, the 
variance of feature values is calculated. Variance measures the spread between features in the 
dataset. Features with low variances usually do not give much knowledge. Therefore, they were 
filtered out during training. Equation (21) shows the variance.  
σ2 =
∑ 𝑥2
𝑛
𝑘=0
𝑁
− 𝜇2 
 
(21) 
Another method to reduce the number of features is to look at their correlation coefficient. 
Correlation coefficient shows how much the variances of two variables are associated with each 
other. Equation (22) is used to calculate the correlation coefficient among the given features.  
𝑟 =
∑(𝑥 − ?̅?)(𝑦 − ?̅?)
√∑(𝑥 − ?̅?)2  ∑(𝑦 − ?̅?)2
 
 
(22) 
In addition to variance and correlation coefficient, “Least Square Regression Error” (LSQE) 
and “Maximal Information Compression Index” (MICI) are used to minimize the features’ 
similarity and maximize dimensionality reduction.  
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LSQE or residual variance is the error of predicting y from y = bx + a while a and b are the 
regression coefficients which can be calculated by minimizing e(x, y)2 in (23). (24), (25) and 
(25) show the derivation of them, 
𝑒(𝑥, 𝑦)2 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑒(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑖
2 
 
(23) 
 
𝑒(𝑥, 𝑦)2 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑥𝑖  (24) 
  
𝑎 = ?̅? (25) 
  
𝑏 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝑥, 𝑦)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥)
 
(26) 
  
Once a and b are calculated, the mean square error e(x, y) can then be calculated by (27) 
𝑒(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥) × (1 − 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥, 𝑦)2) (27) 
(27) essentially measures the relationship between two features x and y. If these features 
have a linear relationship, then e(x, y) will be 0, and if they do not have a relationship, then e(x, 
y) will be equal to var(x).  
MICI, denoted by λ2(x, y), is calculated using (28) 
𝜆2(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑣(Σ)) (28) 
Where ∑  provides the covariance of x and y while eigv is a vector of Eigenvalues of that 
covariance. When MICI is 0 the features have a linear relationship. A higher MICI means that 
the relationship is non-existent.  
From all of the four of the methods described above, 12 features are identified to be 
removed from the data. These features are similar enough, and they do not provide distinct 
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knowledge to the training model of the IDS. Therefore, the number of features in the dataset is 
reduced from 24 to 12.  
As an additional clarification note, while analyzing the data, the value coreData_id is a 
numerical value, but it contained a “string” value due to a random “B” added at the end of one of 
the values. This value was being treated as string and was causing an error in the programming. 
After some validation, it was concluded that this might be a potential error from a data collection 
method, so “3132544B” is replaced with “31325440” to keep the dataset consistent.  
 
Figure 5.3: Intrusion Detection System Architecture  
5.4. Two Stage IDS  
After “feature engineering” or data pre-processing, the next step is to design a two-stage, 
intrusion detection system architecture based on machine learning algorithms. The contribution 
and novelty of this architecture is the ability to use a two-stage machine learning approach in the 
design of IDS. This is done in order to avoid false positives and accurately detect/prevent an 
attack. The objective of the first phase (stage) is to simply detect whether there is an attack 
   
 
95 
 
present or not. The second phase (stage) is to classify that attack and provide an alert for it. 
Figure 5.3 shows the architecture block diagram of the proposed system.  
5.4.1. First stage: Detect! 
The first stage uses an unsupervised, clustering algorithm to detect an attack. Clustering in 
this phase simply classifies the data into two categories: “attack” connections or “normal” 
connections. The design objective for this stage is to simply detect if there is an attack or not. To 
accomplish this classification, two clusters with low intercluster similarity and good intra-cluster 
similarity are built. 
One of the tasks in this part of the study was to select the right algorithm for clustering. The 
dataset was unknown, and unfortunately, there are no other papers available to benchmark it 
against. Being the first work in this area, the data were tested, analyzed, and benchmarked 
against a number of clustering algorithms such as Canopy Clustering [124], Density-Based K-
Means, Filtered Cluster, K-Means [26], and FarthestFirst  [125]. Performance and time to 
train/predict were used as decisive factors. K-Means and its variants were outputting 
homogenous clusters, which is not feasible for our data since only 3.42% of the messages are 
malicious. A less known algorithm, FarthestFirst [126], [125], which is modeled on K-Means, 
performed significantly better than all the rest as shown in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2: Clustering Algorithm Performances 
Algorithm Cluster 1 (Attack) Cluster 2 (Normal) 
Canopy 10% 90% 
Density Based K-Means 49% 51% 
FilteredCluster 49% 51% 
K-Means 49% 51% 
FarthestFirst  2% 98% 
Ground Truth  3.42% 96.58% 
FarthestFirst is a version of K-means algorithm and based on the farthest-first traversal k-
center. This algorithm is substantially faster than a regular K-Means. In this experiment, 
FarthestFirst was 10.8 times faster than a simple K-Means. FarthestFirst works in the following 
manner. There are X(1), ... ,X(n) BSM messages on the data (D). This data is described by 12 
features and 𝑓(𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝐷) describes the frequency count of feature value xi,j in the dataset [127].  
A scoring function is used to evaluate each point:  
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝑋𝑖)  =  ∑𝑓(𝑥𝑖,𝑗|𝐷)
12
𝑗=1
 
(29) 
The following steps are used to in the algorithm [127]:  
- Randomly select the first cluster1 center  
- For every other point calculate the distance with the cluster1 center 
- Select the point with the maximum distance as the cluster2 center  
- For every other point calculate and assign points with either of the cluster 
centers according to the minimal distance.  
The objective of the algorithm is to separate this in a few clusters – in this case, the 
objective is to split it into two clusters (attack and normal). 
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Figure 5.4 below shows the visual results of data clustering for attack detection based on the 
FarthestFirst algorithm.  
  
Figure 5.4: FarthestFirst Clustering 
As shown in Figure 5.4, there are two well-separated clusters. The blue cluster shows the 
normal messages and the red cluster shows the malicious messages. It is important to note that 
the blue cluster (normal) is clear from red points (malicious messages). The objective in this 
stage is for the blue cluster to be as “clean” as possible from attacks to reduce the number of 
messages to be processed in the second stage. It is OK if the red cluster includes some blue 
(normal) messages because the second stage will help with reducing the number of false 
positives. Results are given in the table below:  
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Table 5.3: Stage 1 Results (Detect) 
 Clustering True Labels 
Normal 98% 96.58% 
Attack 2% 3.42% 
Time to Build 
Model 
0.14s 
Normal Cluster 
Center 
105.0 3.031E7 15600.0 41.2336304 -105.43659 2616.5 
0.0 3.25 8.0 NEUTRAL 20.44 3.3 Normal Normal 
Attack Cluster 
Center 
1.0 3.032E7 58100.0 41.2391481 -105.4375635 2631.8 
0.0 2.35 2.95 forwardGears 1655.7 348.85 Tempering 
Attack 
Stage 1 Accuracy 98.58% 
After building the model, the detection accuracy for the first stage is 98.58%. 
5.4.2. Second Stage: Classify!  
After detecting an attack in phase one, the next step is to classify that attacks in stage two. 
Please note that although some performance results are given in this Chapter, the performance 
analyzation is done in Chapter VII. Subsections below describe the four machine learning 
algorithms used for stage two.  
5.4.2.1. J48 
J48 is a decision tree-based algorithm which classifies data. This algorithm builds decision 
trees by using information entropy and is based on the C4.5 decision tree. This algorithm is often 
referred to as a statistical classifier because it bases its decision tree on labeled input data. When 
building the tree, J48 chooses the attributes based on the information gain, or whichever attribute 
results in the most efficient split of the data. The steps below describe how the algorithm works 
in detail: 
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1- Calculate the entropy using equation (30)  
 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦 = ∑𝐶𝑖=1 − 𝑝𝑖  ∗  log2(𝑝𝑖) (30) 
2- Calculate information gain rate using equation (31). The gain is basically the difference 
of prior entropy (T) and the entropy of the selected branch (X).  
 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑇, 𝑋) = 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦(𝑇) − 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦(𝑋) (31) 
3- After calculating the Gain for each candidate attribute, then the data is split based on the 
attribute with the highest information gain.  
Repeat steps 1-3 until the leaf level [128].  
After applying the provided data to the first stage and using J48 as the second stage, the 
following performance results were obtained as shown in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: J48 Performance Results 
Name Value 
Number of Leaves 8 
Size of the tree 14 
Correctly classified 99.9965% 
True Positive Rate 1.0 
False Positive Rate  0.0 
F-Measure 1.0 
Time to Build Model 1.5 (s) 
 
Performance variables shown in Table 5.4 are described below:  
• Classification accuracy: % of connections that are classified correctly  
• True positives: proportion of instances predicted positive that are actually positive  
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• False positives: proportion of instances predicted positive but are actually negative  
• F-Measure: measure of test’s accuracy  
• Time to Build Model – time it takes to build the model based on the BSM data 
As observed from the results table, stage two was able to decrease the number of false 
positives (FP) to 0 and increase the accuracy results to 99.9965%. This is a significant 
improvement from stage one results. 
Confusion Matrix is given in Table 5.5:  
Table 5.5: J48 Confusion Matrix 
Spoofing Normal Information 
Disclosure 
Tempering DOS Classified 
as 
 
95 0 0 0 0 Spoofing 
0 111064 0 0 4 Normal 
0 0 1648 0 0 Information 
Disclosure 
0 0 0 1967 0 Tempering 
0 0 0 0 220 DOS 
 
- Advantages: J48 is an easy algorithm to implement and visualize. Since it is based on 
C4.5, it performs well in discrete data with more than two classes, which is also one of 
the main reasons why J48 is chosen as one of the candidate algorithms in stage two. In 
addition, computational requirements for decision making are low compared with other 
algorithms used in this dissertation. Looking at the literature survey available, J48 is used 
commonly in medical and clinical applications, weather prediction, and banking data. 
- Disadvantages: When looking at the training computational requirements, generally J48 
takes more time and memory to be trained. If a J48 decision tree is not able to be 
configured properly, it results in a large tree, and the algorithm denigrates easy. If J48 
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outputs a complex tree, it gives off a poor performance and requires high computational 
power. That is why it is recommended to apply tree pruning, which helps with 
complexity and sometimes avoids overfitting and other classification errors. J48 and 
decisions trees, in general, have limits when dealing with continuous data, or decisions 
which require more than one output per attribute  
5.4.2.2. Random Forest 
 Random Forest uses an ensemble learning method to combine decision trees, similar to 
those explained previously. This algorithm is similar to a technique known as bagging. Bagging 
is a machine learning ensemble meta-algorithm aimed at improving accuracy, reducing variance, 
and avoiding over-fitting. In a single decision tree, the predictions are sensitive due to certain 
data characteristics or noise. Bagging takes the average performance of multiple trees, so it 
eliminates such sensitivity and gives a more accurate performance. Random Forest improves 
bagging with a multitude of decision trees [129]. The mode output among the decision trees is 
the output of the Random Forest. Table 5.6 provides the IDS performance results while using 
Random Forest in the second stage. 
Table 5.6: Random Forest Performance Results 
Name Value 
Number of Iterations 100 
Correctly classified 99.9983% 
True Positive Rate 1.000 
False Positive Rate 0.000 
F-Measure 1.000 
Time to Build Model 31.27s 
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Table 5.7: Random Forest Confusion Matrix 
Spoofing Normal Information 
Disclosure 
Tempering DOS Classified 
as 
 
95 0 0 0 0 Spoofing 
0 111066 0 0 2 Normal 
0 0 1648 0 0 Information 
Disclosure 
0 0 0 1967 0 Tempering 
0 0 0 0 220 DOS 
 
Only 2 BSM messages are misclassified as an attack in this algorithm.  
-  Advantages: Random Forest does a great job at correctly classifying and identifying 
malicious attacks from the data with only two normal packages misclassified as an attack. 
Although the dataset is large, the results show that errors are countable, and the accuracy 
is improved to 99.9983%. Based on literature survey, Random Forest is widely known to 
be one of the most accurate learning algorithms, and that is also the reason why it was 
selected as one of the algorithm candidates for stage two [129]. Random Forest in the 
second stage gives the best accuracy in this dissertation. This accuracy does not denigrate 
even with a large dataset or even at times when a large portion of the messages are 
missing. Once trained, this algorithm can also be reused in other models with similar data 
which is another feature making the Random Forest a predominant algorithm to be used 
for classification problems. Random Forest is commonly used in areas of medicine, e-
commerce, and stock market application. 
- Disadvantages: A high performance in Random Forest also comes with an increase in 
computational cost. A small improvement over J48 comes with 20 times longer time to 
build. Another disadvantage of Random Forest is the fact that it is hard to interpret it. In 
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addition, a careful analysis is needed in deciding its configuration parameters according 
to the dataset used as otherwise the performance accuracy will suffer. 
5.4.2.3. AdaBoost 
Adaptive Boosting is another ensemble of machine learning algorithm developed by Yoav 
Freund and Robert Schapiro[128]. In Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost), the ensemble is built in 
such a way that prediction errors are improved at every layer. The subsequent models focus on 
fixing errors made by prior models. This is similar to regular boosting algorithms. Adaptive 
Boosting adds short decision trees in series until the performance is not subsequently improved. 
Performance results for IDS with Adaptive Boosting are shown in Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 
Table 5.8: AdaBoost Performance Results 
Name Value 
Correctly classified 98.293% 
True Positive Rate 0.983 
False Positive Rate 0.459 
F-Measure 0.974 
Time to Build Model 45.65s 
Table 5.9: AdaBoost Confusion Matrix 
Spoofing Normal Information 
Disclosure 
Tempering DOS Classified 
as 
 
0 0 0 95 0 Spoofing 
0 111068 0 0 0 Normal 
0 0 1648 0 0 Information 
Disclosure 
0 0 0 1967 0 Tempering 
0 220 0 0 0 DOS 
- Advantages: AdaBoost is not a complicated algorithm to implement. Generally, the 
algorithm is known to give a good generalization and is used in many classification 
problems. AdaBoost is usually not prone to over-fitting due to its "boosting" technique. 
This algorithm is used in many classification problems, and it is known to improve 
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classification errors through boosting. In our case, AdaBoost does not give the best 
performance in terms of accuracy. Its implementation efficiency and over-fitting 
avoidance are the reasons why AdaBoost was selected as the third algorithm candidate. 
There are a few papers which have evaluated the use of AdaBoost in different 
applications such as [130], [131] and consider it as one of the best "off the shelf" 
algorithms. Applications where AdaBoost has been implemented successfully mainly 
focus on optical character recognition, pedestrian detection systems, speech, and facial 
recognition, etc. 
- Disadvantages: One of the main disadvantages of AdaBoost is its sensitivity due to noise 
in the dataset and potential outliers. This property is also shown when applied to our data. 
When additional unknown attacks or outlier packages are injected, AdaBoost suffers in 
their classification. As it will be analyzed below, this algorithm is not the most optimal 
solution for the given problem, this is also often the case for other complex classification 
problems as well. 
5.4.2.4. Naive Bayes 
 Naive Bayes is another algorithm selected for use in the second stage of the intrusion 
detection system. This algorithm uses a probabilistic classification and is based on Bayes 
theorem. The objective of this algorithm is to determine the probability of the features happening 
in every class and return the highest probable class. 
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) =
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) 𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐵)
 
(32) 
Equation (32) calculates the probability of an event (A) considering the prior probability of 
conditions (B) that might be related to the event (A). 
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Table 5.10 and Table 5.11 provide the performance results of the IDS with Naive Bayes as 
the algorithm in the second stage 
Table 5.10: Naive Bayes Performance Results 
Name Value 
Correctly classified 99.9878% 
True Positive Rate 1.000 
False Positive Rate  0.003 
F-Measure 1.000 
Time to Build Model 0.3s 
 
Table 5.11: Naive Bayes Confusion Matrix 
Spoofing Normal Information 
Disclosure 
Tempering DOS Classified as 
 
95 0 0 0 0 Spoofing 
0 111065 0 0 3 Normal 
0 3 1645 0 0 Information 
Disclosure 
0 8 0 1959 0 Tempering 
0 0 0 0 220 DOS 
 
- Advantages: Naive Bayes is primarily based on the conditional independence assumption 
as shown by equation (32). When the dataset holds the conditional independence 
assumption as true, then the algorithm converges quickly, making it more efficient than 
other logistic regression algorithms. In this scenario, the algorithm can also be trained 
with less data. One of the most common applications that uses Naive Bayes is email spam 
detection and news categorization. Its ability to infer based on the independence 
assumption is also the reason why Naive Bayes was selected in this dissertation. This 
property makes this algorithm to be suitable with other applications such as sentiment 
analysis, digit recognition, etc. 
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- Disadvantages: Naive Bayes is an algorithm that does not perform well in datasets where 
features are not independent of each other. This can be observed when some of the 
messages were not independent, and Naive Bayes failed, just in those instances.
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Chapter 6. Performance Evaluation and Conclusions 
This dissertation proposes a three-step framework. First, through the threat analysis, this work 
was able to identify and analyze vehicle communication threats within V2X. During a normal 
cybersecurity analysis process, the first step is to perform threat analysis and determine the 
landscape. The second step described in chapter IV assesses such threats using a new proposed 
model and assigns them a scale from E0 to E3 accordingly. Lastly, Chapter V proposes a new 
intrusion detection system which can detect threats using a BSM dataset. 
 
Figure 6.1: Complete Framework 
This framework defines a continuous process as shown in Figure 6.1. This process analyzes 
threats, assesses them, detects threats, determines the assess-detect correlation to select the best 
algorithm for protection, and continues analyzing threats to restart the process all over again. 
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This chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1 describes the correlation between Assess 
and Detect; 6.2 analyzes the performance of FTAM and IDS; 6.3 gives summary and 
conclusions; and 6.4 closes with recommendations for future work.  
6.1. Assess and Detect – Their Correlation  
In order to complete this framework, results of FTAM are correlated with the IDS results in 
order to establish a relationship between the different algorithms used in IDS and the output of 
FTAM. Table 6.1 essentially shows how each of the algorithms performs against Spoofing, 
Tempering, Information Disclosure, and DoS. For the purpose of this step, both Decision Tree-
based algorithms are considered in one column since their performances are similar.  
Table 6.1: Best Performing IDS algorithms for each FTAM level 
STERIDE FTAM Level Decision Trees AdaBoost NaiveBayes 
Information 
Disclosure 
E1 ✓ ✓  
Spoofing E2 ✓  ✓ 
Tempering E3 ✓ ✓  
DoS E3 ✓  ✓ 
Based on the preliminary results of this dissertation as shown in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2  
this dissertation establishes the following hypothesis:  
“There is a correlative relationship between the Fuzzy-Based Threat Model levels and the 
machine learning algorithms used in stage two of the Intrusion Detection System.” 
Table 6.2: Assess-Detect Correlation 
FTAM Level IDS Algorithm 
E0 All 
E1 Decision Trees + AdaBoost 
E2 Decision Trees + Naïve Bayes 
E3 Decision Trees + AdaBoost 
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From the literature review, this is the first time such a concept of correlation is introduced. 
This relationship is the basis for another research study. To be fully proved out, it needs further 
research, more validation, a robust and standard dataset, and testing more algorithms. For the 
purpose of this paragraph, it proves out the concept that there is a correlation between the two, 
and this relationship can prove out to be useful in protecting from threats with a certain 
assessment level.  
6.2. Performance Summary  
Subsections below provide a performance summary for all of the elements in this 
dissertation.  
6.2.1. FTAM Performance Benchmarking and Analysis 
To validate FTAM, its performance is analyzed by benchmarking results with other known, 
established, and accepted models. In order to test this model, some generic attacks are defined 
first. These attacks are defined according to the STRIDE model, and a V2X environment is used 
in their definition. The list below provides some quick definitions for the attacks used.  
- Spoofing (S) – The objective of a spoofing attack is to bypass the authentication 
mechanism by spoofing the sender's ID. In a V2X environment, this is done by 
masquerading certain BSM data, so that it looks like the messages are coming from a 
certain vehicle. 
- Tempering (T) – This threat attempts to temper values of data in a memory location or 
temper BSM data. This is often done by tempering BSM messages in order to allow data 
to pass through. 
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- Repudiation (R) – This attack tries to replay an old message and resent it. Usually, this 
happens when the receiver does not verify the sender’s authenticity or freshness. This is 
often done by replaying BSM messages repeatedly 
- Information Disclosure (I) – This attack is realized by eavesdropping or trying to listen in 
the communication channel in order to intercept communication.  
- Denial of Service (D) – This attack attempts to take down the V2X network by jamming 
the communication and resending a massive number of packages. This can be 
accomplished by sending a high amount of BSM messages in a short time to be processed 
by the network.  
- Elevation of Privileges (E) – This attack happens when messages that are sent attempt to 
obtain higher privileges. For example, fake high priority messages which attempt to flash 
malicious software would consist of an E type of attack.  
Based on this definition of STRIDE, threats are analyzed and run through FTAM to 
determine a threat level. Please note that in a normal implementation, their characterization 
would depend on internal organization assessment. For this exercise, data is derived from the 
levels on some of the examples shown in [13] [66] [112] [106] [119] and [111]. Since FTAM 
characterizations are aligned with EVITA and others, it is easy to extract the inputs for 
validation. Last column on  
Table 6.3 below shows the results of the FTAM for each of the threats defined above. 
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Table 6.3: FTAM - STRIDE Threat Levels 
Threat 
Attack Impact Attacker Capability Withstand Potential 
TL Privacy Safety Fin 
Loss 
Expertise Resources F&O 
gain 
Controllability Difficulty 
S 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 E2 
T 1 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 E3 
R 0 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 E2 
I 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 E1 
D 1 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 E3 
E 1 2 2 3 2 2 1 3 E2 
As observed, threat levels in this scenario range from E1 to E3. In this case, there is no E0 
level which is a low threat. To verify that FTAM produces accurate levels, these same threats are 
run with the same characteristics through two other accepted models (EVITA and HEAVENS) to 
compare and benchmark. This test is done to compare FTAM with the other models based on the 
same data. Results given in Table 6.4 show an accurate proportional relationship between 
FTAM, EVITA, and HEAVENS. 
Table 6.4: STRIDE Threat Levels for FTAM, EVITA, and HEAVENS 
Threat FTAM EVITA 
HEAVENS 
(TL Score) 
HEAVENS 
(TL Level) 
S E2 R4 6 Medium 
T E3 R5 2 High 
R E2 R3 5 Medium 
I E1 R2 8 Low 
D E3 R6 1 Critical 
E E2 R3 3 High 
6.2.2. FTAM Advantage  
Results in Table 6.4 and additional experimentation are used to build a relationship between 
FTAM, EVITA, HEAVENS, and functional safety standards (EAL, SIL, and ASIL). These 
results are shown in Table 6.5. At the beginning of this dissertation, a set of reasons was 
provided on why a new Threat Assessment model was proposed. The bullet points below 
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reiterate those reasons while explaining how FTAM has closed those gaps and has an advantage 
compared with other threats models. 
- FTAM is designed with safety in mind. Through the knowledge embedded into FIS, the 
important elements such as safety, privacy are always protected, and their importance is 
reflected at the final Threat Level output. 
- Compared with EVITA, NHTSA and HEAVENS, FTAM does not require a significant 
effort to assess a threat. The final integration is offered as a package and organizations 
can configure it for their own use. In addition, FTAM does not use a subjective 
assessment; therefore, it does not have any issues with ambiguous assessments like some 
of the other models.  
- As mentioned previously, SAE J3061 allows and encourages individual organizations to 
select their threat assessment of choice. FTAM is designed with flexibility in mind. This 
framework can be adapted according to organizational needs and adapted quickly. FTAM 
allows that organizations can also define their own risk acceptance levels. This is an 
advantage compared to other models which have embedded table lookups or rigid 
assessments.  
- Most importantly, FTAM is not subjective in its assessment. It uses a clearly defined 
Fuzzy architecture to perform threat assessment. Fuzzy Logic in FTAM can deal with 
subjective notations or characterizations. 
- Other threat assessments often result in inconsistent categorization. For example: Threats 
35 and 54 presented in [119] are both Denial of Service attacks (D type of attacks). 
FTAM classifies both of these threats as E3 ,consistent with its categorization in STRIDE 
where D is categorized as E3. EVITA categorizes threat 35 as R3 and HEAVENS 
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categorize it as Medium. While for Threat 54, EVITA categorizes it as R2 and 
HEAVENS as “Low.” Both of these threats are Denial of Service and assuming that its 
characteristics are the same they should be categorized as Medium from HEAVENS or 
R3/R4 from EVITA, which is not the case. Meanwhile, FTAM is consistent and 
categorizes them both as E3. 
Based on these experimental results, Table 6.5 determines the relationship between FTAM, 
EVITA, HEAVENS, and some of the functional safety standards.  
Table 6.5: FTAM Levels 
FTAM EVITA HEAVENS EAL SIL ASIL 
E0 R0 None 0 N/A QM 
E1 R1 Low 1 1 A 
E1 R2 Low 2 1 A 
E2 R3 Medium 3 2 B 
E2 R4 Medium 4 2 B 
E3 R5 High 5 3 C 
E3 R6 Critical 6 3 D 
E3 R7 Critical 7 4 N/A 
N/A R7+ Risk beyond acceptable levels 
6.2.3. IDS Performance Evaluation  
Performance evaluation tables for the individual algorithms in the proposed Intrusion 
Detection System are given in 5.4. Figure 6.2 shows the performance summary results from the 
four algorithms tested in the second stage 
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Figure 6.2: Attacks Correctly Classified 
 As shown, the J48 (99.9965%) and Naive Bayes (99.9878%) have the best classification 
accuracies when it comes to performance. Both of these algorithms—assisted by FarthestFirst in 
stage one—are able to eliminate false positives. As mentioned previously, false positives are a 
syndrome of anomaly based intrusions, and this proposed IDS architecture in this dissertation is 
able to cope with them in an easy and efficient way 
6.2.4. IDS Computational Performance  
In order to evaluate the performance of the algorithms, the computational time required to 
train and test the algorithms is used. The models were built and tested using a Windows HP 
Desktop with an Intel Core i7-6700 CPU @ 3.40 GHz. Table 6.6 shows computational times 
versus classification performance. 
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Table 6.6: Summarized Results 
Algorithm Classification 
Performance 
Time to train 
J48 99.9965% 1.5 (s) 
NaiveBayes 99.9878% 0.3 (s) 
Random 
Forest 
99.9830% 31.27 (s) 
AdaBoost 98.2930% 45.65 (s) 
When it comes to classification performance, J48 is the best algorithm to perform. Looking 
at the computational time required, Naive Bayes delivers similar performance results (within 
0.01% of J48) but with 5 times better computational time requirement. The limited data shows 
that there is a correlation between the threat level and the computational time required, the higher 
the threat level, more computational time is required to detect. This relationship is subjective 
considering the limited data points considered in this dissertation.  
6.2.5. State-of-the-art Comparison  
Another additional factor in IDS performance evaluation is to compare it with state-of-the-
art. Unfortunately, due to using a newly released dataset, there is no published work available 
with the same dataset to make an “apple-to-apple” comparison for the performances. Due to this 
factor, the same algorithms with the same architecture were tested on a standard Knowledge 
Discovery Dataset. This dataset is one of the most widely used datasets in the evaluation of 
Intrusion Detection Systems. It was built by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
and used in the International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tool Competition [132].  
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Table 6.7: KDD IDS Performance Results 
Research Paper Algorithm Accuracy (%) F-Measure 
2017: Meena, Choudhary 
[133] 
Bayes 92.72 0.916 
2017: Meena, Choudhary 
[133] 
J48 99.45 0.993 
2016: Subba et al. [134] C4.5 (best) 98.74 Nor reported 
2017: Kushwaha et al. [86] SVM 99.63 0.99 
Proposed Algorithm Two Stage  99.95 0.999 
As it can be observed from Table 6.7, the proposed IDS in this dissertation, used in another 
dataset outperforms other proposed IDS in that same dataset. Similar pre-processing was used in 
this experiment as well. These results are published in [26] 
6.3. Summary 
This dissertation provided a three-step framework for V2X cybersecurity using Machine 
Learning methods. Chapter I gives an introduction of the area and makes the case for the need of 
this research. Chapter II focuses on the literature survey and reviews some of the main aspects 
worked on this dissertation. Chapter III is the first step of the framework and does a threat 
analyzation based on the STRIDE framework[27].  
In chapter IV, the case for automotive threat assessment models and their role in defining 
cybersecurity requirements is presented first. In addition, this chapter does analysis for some of 
the existing threat assessment models. Based on this analysis, a new, innovative Fuzzy based 
threat assessment model (FTAM) is proposed. The use of Fuzzy Logic in threat assessment 
makes it possible to mitigate or eliminate the drawbacks identified from the other existing 
models and improve the threat assessment process. This system is the first of its type and is 
designed based on some elements from existing models such as EVITA[13], NHTSA[12], 
HEAVENS[106], UM[114] and OCTAVE[107]. The Fuzzy Logic makes FTAM a flexible 
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framework which is able to produce threat levels based on different assessments with no 
ambiguous characterizations. FTAM uses six Fuzzy inference systems in a multistage 
architecture similar to [28]. This proposed model was also benchmarked against EVITA and 
HEAVENS for validation purposes. Based on this benchmark, a level relationship between 
FTAM, EVITA, HEAVENS, and other functional safety standards such as EAL, SIL, ASIL was 
established. The results of FTAM are used to drive the design of the next Detect phase.  
The Detect phase is described in Chapter V. This chapter initially provides a background in 
intrusion detection systems and their importance in the cybersecurity space. Then the dataset 
from Wyoming DOT Connected Vehicle Pilot is used and analyzed[17]. This dissertation is the 
first to publish IDS results on this dataset. Before usage, the data is pre-processed using variance, 
correlation coefficients, Least Square Regression Error, and Maximal Information Compression 
Index. Pre-processing the data is necessary to reduce the number of features and help with 
avoiding bias and overfitting. After such feature engineering, the data is used to build an 
intelligent, two-stage intrusion detection system. The first stage uses the FurthestFirst 
unsupervised learning algorithm to detect an attack while the second stage tests four different 
supervised learning algorithms (J48, Random Forest, Nave Bayes, and Adaptive Boosting) to 
classify the attacks. After building and testing the two-stage model, a high accuracy in 
performance results was achieved. In addition, the proposed IDS was able to fully eliminate the 
number of false positives which are usually a syndrome of anomaly-based intrusion detection 
systems. 
The last chapter in this dissertation does a performance evaluation of FTAM, IDS, and their 
relationship. From an FTAM perspective, the model is compared against other models using the 
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same threats and advantages of this work are given. From an IDS perspective, the performance 
results are analyzed regarding accuracy and computational requirements. This chapter also sets 
the ground for a relationship between the detect and assess steps. Due to being the first study 
using such methodology or dataset, there are some limitations on the state-of-the-art comparison, 
but some comparisons and benchmarking with other works is given.  
6.4. Conclusions and Future Work Recommendations    
Based on the results obtained from this dissertation, below is a list of conclusions and future 
work recommendations.  
- Fuzzy Logic improves threat assessment processes and can cope with limitations when 
problems include linguistic variables. This method should be used in other risk or threat 
assessment models to build flexible frameworks.  
- Threat analyzation is an important and required step in understanding and solving 
cybersecurity problems. Using commonly known, standardized characterizations and 
open source frameworks is recommended to cope with cybersecurity challenges.  
- Threat characterizations should be standardized, but the methodologies on how you 
determine the degree of the threat should be flexible enough to allow for needed 
customizations. 
- A multistage architecture in Fuzzy Logic reduces the number of rules required to build 
the system and enables a stronger relationship between the layers for a more manageable 
framework.  
- There is a correlation or relationship between the threat assessment methods and methods 
used to detect threats or protect from them. Further work needs to be done in establishing 
or proving out this relationship.  
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- Cybersecurity solutions should evaluate and approach problems holistically rather than in 
individual silos. Intruders’ ultimate objective is to “hack” the system, not its individual 
components.  
- The proposed two-stage architecture which combines unsupervised and supervised 
learning algorithm produces better accuracy, lowers the number of false positives, and 
improves computational requirements. This architecture can be used in a variety of 
machine learning and artificial intelligence problems.  
- Feature engineering focused on dimensionality reduction is a recommended step to 
reduce bias and improve performance results for classical machine learning algorithms.  
- Algorithm selection in machine learning or data science should be based on factors such 
as computational requirements, dataset characteristics, type of problems and others rather 
then generalized performances or stereotypes for certain algorithms.  
- Additional research on other standardized datasets are needed to build and analyze the 
use of intrusion detection systems using BSM messages.  
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APPENDIX 
%% MATLAB script to instantiate the FIS models  
clear;  
FIS1 = readfis('FIS1PrivSec_v2'); 
FIS2 = readfis('FIS2ExpertiseResources'); 
FIS3 = readfis('FIS3SecFinloss_V2'); 
FIS4 = readfis('FIS4FinGainAgentLevel'); 
FIS5 = readfis('FIS5DiffControl'); 
 
%% create final FIS6 from the FIS1-5 
FIS6 = mamfis; 
FIS6 = mamfis("NumInputs",3,"NumOutputs",1); 
FIS6 = mamfis("NumInputs",3); 
FIS6.Inputs(1)=FIS3.Output(1); 
FIS6.Inputs(2)=FIS4.Output(1); 
FIS6.Inputs(3)=FIS5.Output(1); 
FIS6 = addOutput(FIS6, [0 3],'NumMFs' ,4,'MFType',"gaussmf"); 
FIS6.Outputs(1).Name = "ThreatLevel"; 
fuzzyLogicDesigner(FIS6) 
  
%% initialize FUZZY constants as needed  
set_param('SimulinkModelV3/Privacy','Value','1') 
set_param('SimulinkModelV3/Safety','Value','2') 
set_param('SimulinkModelV3/Financial Loss','Value','2') 
set_param('SimulinkModelV3/Expertise','Value','2') 
set_param('SimulinkModelV3/Resources','Value','3') 
set_param('SimulinkModelV3/Financial Gain','Value','2') 
set_param('SimulinkModelV3/Controllability','Value','1') 
set_param('SimulinkModelV3/Difficulty','Value','3') 
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